Research on Economic Consequences of Chinese Enterprises’ Acquisitions Overseas中国企业海外并购经济后果研究—Case Study on Basis of Lenovo Merging IBM PC Business - 蜂朝网
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Research on Economic Consequences of Chinese Enterprises’ Acquisitions Overseas中国企业海外并购经济后果研究—Case Study on Basis of Lenovo Merging IBM PC Business

时间: 2013-10-05 编号:sb201310051724489546 作者:蜂朝网
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文章摘要:
Lenovo announced they have purchased IBM's PC business on December 8, 2004, in order to meet the market development and the aspirations of its own interests. Lenovo, as the Chinese biggest winner in acquisitions overseas, caused a global concern and Chinese enterprises’ eager expecting. Compared with economic consequences of aphasia from TCL, BOE and BenQ’s acquisitions overseas, whether Lenovo’s merger could escape from the "winners curse"? This paper will research on economic consequences of Lenovo’s acquisitions overseas from two aspects, respectively.

1.1. Background1.1. 研究背景 


To some extent, the level of activity in mergers can reflect the strength of economic subjects, and it can also promote economic growth. In recent years the world mergers and acquisitions market is becoming active again, which is called as the sixth global merger wave, and the new wave maintains a 29% annual growth rate. The dealogic data shows that global mergers and acquisitions in 2005 totally amounts to 2.9 trillion US dollars, by 40% growth from 2004, and it reaches the highest record since 2000. While China’s amount of mergers and acquisitions business is 41 billion in the first half of 2006 by an increase of 71%①. Chinese government has put enterprises to "going out" on the agenda, and pay a strategic attention to expansion overseas, so foreign exchange management departments have actively opened a green passage for the amount of foreign exchange required by acquisitions overseas. 在一定程度上,并购交易的活跃程度能反映经济主体的实力,同时也能推动了经济增长。近年来世界并购交易市场再度活跃,业界称之为第六次全球并购浪潮,新一轮并购浪潮保持了29%的年增长率。Dealogic公告数据显示,2005年全球并购总额已达2.9万亿美元,较2004年度猛增了40%,创下了2000年以来的最高记录,与此同时,中国2006年上半年的并购交易金额就达到410亿美元,同比增长71%①。为了进一步提升国家的竞争优势,中国政府已将企业走出去提上了日事议程,并将海外拓展摆到了重要的战略高度。从2003年到2005上半年年,商务部多次牵头出台了鼓励海外并购的具体措施,外汇管理部门也积极为海外并购所需的外汇额度开通绿色通道。

In this wave of mergers and acquisitions, Chinese gradually expanding enterprises, which are confronted with entry frenzy of foreign capital, try every effort to catch up others in the grand banquet of the world's resources, in order to obtain comparative advantages in resources for next competition. China will become an important country in the world's merger circle, and has promising prospects, because China enterprises have used to adopt merger policy in their growing processes, and make merger as an important channel to expand business and add their market shares. In addition, the Chinese enterprises also showed their strength in the international market②. 在这次并购浪潮中,面对虎视眈眈的国外资本进入狂潮,为在未来竞争中取得具有比较优势的资源禀赋,逐渐壮大的中国企业亦在这场瓜分世界资源的盛宴中奋起直追。中国将成为世界并购圈中的重要国家,中国企业成长过程中已经习惯了采用并购的策略,将并购交易看成是扩张业务,增加市场份额的重要渠道等原因共同造就并购市场喜人的前景,另一方面,中国企业在国际市场上也显示出自己的实力②。 

D. Fig. Trends of Chinese enterprises overseas and domestic merger

Note: The relative data come from Dealogic, and the unit is US dollar.出自己的实力②。 

D。图 中国企业海外并购和国内并购趋势 注:上图相关数据来源于Dealogic,单位以美元计算① Thomas Financial 的统计表明,2006年前3季度全球并购超过2.5万亿美元,较去年同期增长了32%。标准普尔对中国最大200家企业2005年年底情况的调查显示,约有41%的企业沉淀了巨额现金流,这些急于寻找出路的资金将掀起并购高潮。到目前,中国约有6000家境外企业,仅占跨国公司总数的0.4%,投资额仅占世界的0.55%。Dealogic也预测未来5年,中国每年对外投资增长速度至少22%,每年的并购记录会被连续刷新。

①. Thomas Financial statistics shows that the global mergers and acquisitions amount over 2.5 trillion US dollars in the first three quarters of 2006, representing a year-on-year increase of 32%. The Standard and Poor's survey to 200 largest companies’ situations by the end of 2005 shows that, about 41% of the enterprises deposit huge cash flow, and these cash which eager to find a way out, will raise a merger wave. At present, China has about 6,000 foreign enterprises which account for only 0.4% of the total amount of MNC, and the investment only account for 0.55% of the world. Dealogic also forecasts that China's annual growth rate of foreign investment will be 22% at least in the next five years, and each of the acquisition records will be updated continuously.

② Refer to: "Beijing Daily", January 21, 2005, the fourth. But Britain's Financial Times, on October 31, quoted the words of executive Mervyn. Davis, chief Standard Chartered Bank, said that China and India's recent overseas acquisition is only the tip of the iceberg to promote overseas investment in the global trade structural changes. He also said that the economy in some countries develops rapidly and their enterprises restructure assets according to the global new structure, so that the cross-border transactions will be multiplied. He also believes that China and India enterprises overseas expansion will become a major phenomenon of the world within the next 10 to 20 years.② 具体参见:《北京日报》,2005年1月21日第四版。而英国金融时报10月31日报道,引用标准渣打银行首席执行官默文.戴维斯的话说,中国和印度最近的海外并购只是全球贸易结构迅速变化推动海外投资的冰山一角。他也表示,一些国家的经济飞速发展,其企业根据全球经济新结构重组资产,跨境交易将因此大增。他也认为,今后一二十年内中国和印度企业的海外扩张将成为世界一大现象。 

③ BOE Technology Group Co., Ltd. (000725.SZ) released the third quarter earnings in September 28, and it was announced another 360 million loss.③ 京东方科技集团股份有限公司(000725.SZ)于9月28日发布第三季度财报,宣布又亏损3.6亿。 

TCL集团兵败欧洲以及明基宣布其在欧洲移动的子公司破产,成为中国企业海外并购的阴自收购汤姆逊彩电业务和阿尔卡特手机业务以来,TCL集团(000100.SZ)2006年第三季度首次盈利,前三季度348亿元的收入,仍然亏损7亿多元,TCL集团与汤姆逊于2004年合资成立TTE,欧洲业务仍然持续严重亏损,仍是造成集团亏损的重要原因。 

TCL was defeated in Europe and BenQ’s announcement that its European subsidiary of mobile bankrupted, which have become the shadow to Chinese enterprises overseas acquisition. Since merge Thomson TV business and Alcatel's mobile phone business, TCL Group (000100.SZ) made the first profit in the third quarter of 2006.the earning in the first three quarter in 2006 is RMB 34.8 billion yuan, still with loss of more than 700 million yuan. TCL Group and Thomson set up a joint venture TTE in 2004 and the European business remained sustained serious losses, which is still the major reasons to cause these losses.

BenQ also gave us a curriculum about transnational Merger, tell us a lesson as "there's no free lunch". In November 2005, Siemens transferred its mobile phone business to BenQ at a loss of 250 million euros. BenQ intends to leverage its brand reputation to expand its scope of the mobile phone business worldwide, but this essay failed less than a year. On September 29, 2006, BenQ board decided not to www.steelbee.net invest Munich-based BenQ Mobile, while BenQ Germany applies for bankruptcy protection to German court. Therefore, BenQ lost more than 850 million euros. After reflect on the failure, it depended on mistaken decision-making and poor integration. Thus, the ambitious plan, once made to put the company into one of the first international companies through merging Siemens mobile phone, has basically become yesterday's news, following with the employees’ protests and potential threat of litigation.明基也给我们上了一堂“天下没有免费午餐”跨国并购教训的课程。2005年11月,西门子将其手机业务倒贴2.5亿欧元转让给明基。明基也希望借助其品牌的美誉度扩展其在全球范围内的手机业务,然而,这起蛇吞象的业务不到一年就宣告失败。2006年9月29日,明基董事会作出决定,不再向总部位于慕尼黑的明基移动(Benq Mobile)公司基础投资,同时,德国明基也向德国法院申请破产保护。为此,明基损失了8.5亿多欧元,反思失败,更多的是决策的失误和整合不力。至此,曾冀望通过并购西门子手机业务跻身国际一线公司的宏图大计基本上已经成为昨日黄花,随之而来的是雇员抗议和潜在的诉讼威胁。 


1.2 Review of research methods on acquisition economic consequences 1.2 并购经济后果研究方法综述 


    As we all know, merger deals between companies often lead to different degrees of volatility and changes on stock price and financial indicators, So the acquisition performance are generally demonstrated by two methods as: first, the direction of the fluctuation in the stock price before merger and after is used to measure the enterprise performance change (called events or non-normal earnings method). And it is usually to choose time window before and after acquisition announcement to calculate the cumulative abnormal excess return rate so as to measure the performance. Foreign scholars have published a large variety of event study methodology, and they mostly believe that the company be merged will obtain notable excess return rate while the purchaser reverse(Brunner,2002;Jensen & Ruback,1983). 众所周知,公司之间的并购交易往往会导致公司股票价格和财务指标产生不同程度的波动和变化,因此并购的绩效一般会借助两个方法进行实证研究:一是通过公司并购事件发生前后股票价格异常波动的方向来衡量企业绩效变化(称为事件研究法或非正常收益法),通常选择并购公告发布前后时间窗口计算累积超额收益率考察并购的绩效。国外学者已经公开发表了大量丰富的事件研究法成果,结论大多支持被并购公司在并购事件中获得显著的超额正收益率,而收购方则相反(Brunner,2002;Jensen & Ruback,1983)。 

    The second is method of financial indicator. It is mainly to analyze the impact of mergers and acquisitions through comparative analyzing the changes on financial and accounting data before merger and after (Parrino and Harris). This method mainly takes single finance (accounting) indicators (Lang.Et.Al.,1989), or builds financial indicators evaluation system to value the company operating performance (Fenggenfu and Wujianglin,2001) so as to make a further comparison between the performances before merger and after①.  二是财务指标法。会计指标法主要通过对比分析并购交易前后的财务与会计数据变化来分析并购交易的影响(Parrino和 Harris)。该方法主要采用单一的财务(会计)指标(Lang.Et.Al.,1989),或者通过建立财务指标评价体系来评价公司经营的绩效(冯根福、吴江林,2001),从而进一步分析比较并购前后的绩效变化情况①。 


1.3 Literature Review about merger1.3并购文献综述 


1.3.1 Literature Review about merger effect1.3.1 并购效应文献综述 

关于并购效应的经验研究文献可谓汗牛充栋,国外的学者对此进行了大量的研究,并公开发表了丰富的研究成果。一般情况下,公司通过并购可以提高管理效率,从而可以提高公司的资产回报率(Healy,Palepu and Ruback,1992)。Dodde和Ruback(1977)通过分析和研究了1973—1976年期间发生的172次典型要约收购事件发现:不论要约收购成功与否,在收购事件前13个月的时间里,收购方公司的股东能够获得相当显著的正超常收益率,目标公司在事件发生日也能获得相当大的超常收益率。然而,Agrawal,Jaffe和Mandelker(1992),及Magenheim和Mueller(1988)等人的研究结果均发现公司并购后的经营业绩有所下降。Langtieg(1978)的研究结果表明了公司并购后的业绩没有得到显著的提升,尽管被并购企业股东获得了显著为正的超额收益(Abnormal Earning),但无论是从收购日前后3—5日的短窗口还是从收购前后3—5年的长窗口来看,收购企业的股东财富都受到了显著的损失(Jensen 和Ruback,1983;Andrade 等,2001;Jarrell等,1988)。Gregg、Jarerell和Poulsen (1989)通过分析1960—1985年之间发生的663例成功并购案例后发现,目标公司平均超额回报率超过20%;并购方仅有1.14%,但80年代发生的收购方样本的超额收益甚至出现了负数(-1.1%)。 

     The literature about effect of mergers and acquisitions is voluminous. Overseas scholars have conducted a lot of research and published a wealth of research results. Under normal circumstances, the company can improve management efficiency through mergers and acquisitions, so as to improve the company's assets return rate (Healy,Palepu and Ruback,1992). After analyze and research 172 typical tender offer events from 1973 to 1976, Dodde and Ruback (1977) found that whether it is success or not, the shareholders of the merging company can obtain remarkable abnormal excess return rate during the 13 months before merger event day, and the company merged can also obtain sizable abnormal excess return rate at the merger event day. However, Agrawal,Jaffe and Mandelker(1992), Mueller(1988)and so on found that the business performance will fall after merger. Langtieg(1978)found that the performance did not rise after merger though the shareholders of the company be merged obtained remarkable positive abnormal earning. But the shareholders of the merging company suffer remarkable losses, on review of the short window of 3-5 days before and after the acquisition or of the long window of 3-5 years before and after (Jensen and Ruback,1983;Andrade and so on,2001;Jarrell and so on,1988). After analyze 663 successful merger cases happened during 1960 and 1985, Gregg、Jarerell and Poulsen (1989) found that the return rate to the company be merged accessed 20% while if to the merging company is only 1.14%. But the abnormal earning is even a negative rate (-1.1%) in the merging samples happened in the 1980s.

   So we can see that the foreign scholars did not come to an unanimous conclusion on the effect of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, Synergetic Effects Hypothesis gets a huge challenge, and some academics in financial field have come out with some new theory to explain the acquisition of M & A performance after the landslide. For example, Hubris Hypothesis of Roll(1986), Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986)and Arbitrageur Hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny(2003). After summarize the above mentioned literatures, Andrade and so on (2001) indicated any powerful merger and acquisition theory need to consider the effect from surrounding systems to the enterprises. 由此可以看出,国外学者对并购效应的研究并没有得出一致的结论,因此并购动因的协同效应假说(Synergetic Effects Hypothesis)也受到了巨大的挑战,金融学领域的学者为此提出了一些新的理论来解释收购企业并购后出现业绩滑坡的原因,例如,Roll(1986)的自大假说(Hubris Hypothesis),Jensen(1986)的自由现金流量假说(Free Cash Flow Hypothesis)以及Shleifer 和Vishny(2003)的套利假说(Arbitrageur Hypothesis)。Andrade等(2001)在总结上述研究文献后指出,任何具有解释力的并购理论都必须考虑企业所处的环境制度对企业产生的影响


1.3.2 Literature review about domestic merger1.3.2 国内并购文献综述 

中国资本市场快速发展为国内的并购交易提供了良好的平台,在此基础上出现了大量的并购重组案例也为研究提供了便利,在借鉴国外学者的研究方法后,国内学者也公开发表了大量丰富的研究成果。其中,洪锡熙和沈艺峰(2001)分析了3个公司多次收购同一个上市公司的案例,研究发现并购并不能给目标公司带来显著的超额收益。李善民和陈玉罡(2002)对1999—2000年间我国证券市场发生的349起并购事件进行了跟踪研究,研究结果发现并购仅仅给收购公司带来显著的财富增加,而对目标公司股东财富的影响并不显著。 

    Rapid development of China's capital market provides a good platform for domestic merger. On this basis, a lot of merger and reorganization cases provide a convenient for research. In reference to foreign scholars’ research methods, the domestic scholars have published a large variety of research fruits. After analyze a case that three companies merged a listed company for several times, Hongxixi and Shenyifeng (2001) found that merger and acquisition can not bring about significant abnormal earnings to the company merged. After follow and study on 349 merger cases in securities business from 1999 to 2000, Lishanmin and Chenyugang (2002) found that merger can only bring about significant wealth increase to the merging company, but can not have significant effect on the wealth of shareholders of the company merged.

    On basis of Western mature acquisition theory, domestic scholars mostly demonstrate merger performance of China’s listed companies from two points of short window incident response and long-term financial performance. But they did not get the same conclusion as it in Western literatures, especially short window demonstration (Lishanmin and Chenyugang, 2002; Chenxinyuan and Zhangtianyu, 1999; Gaojian and Chenxinwei, 2000). While domestic scholars has been obtained basically the same conclusion,  after research on the literatures based on performance evaluation criteria, that long-term performance of the merged company first rise and then fall down or first balance and then fall daow (Fengfugen, Wulinjiang, 2001). After demonstrately research on the sample companies which merged and Reorganized in 1997, Yuanhongqi and Wuxingyu (1998) found that the proportion of company's earnings per share, net asset yield and investment income all have risen than a year before, and the debt ratio has declined. So the research shows that the mergers and acquisitions are effective. But Fengfugen and Wulinjiang (2001) found that the performance in the year merger happened and the after one year has got a rise to some extent, which show that the performance in the first year after merger is much good, but it in the second year apear to decline obviously. 在以西方学者成熟的并购理论基础上,国内的学者大多从短窗口事件反应和长期财务业绩两个角度来实证检验我国上市公司的并购绩效,但却没有得出与西方研究文献中一致的研究结论,尤其是短窗口检验没有得到一致的结论(李善民和陈玉罡,2002;陈信元和张田余,1999;高见和陈歆玮,2000)。而国内的学者通过对以财务绩效为评价标准的研究却得到了基本一致的结论,即在公司并购后公司长期绩效表现为先升后降或先平后降的明显特征(冯福根、吴林江2001)。原红旗和吴星宇(1998)以1997年的重组公司为样本进行的实证研究中发现1997年样本公司的每股收益、净资产收益率和投资收益占总利润的比重较重组前一年均有所上升,而负债率却有所下降,研究结果发现重组是有效的。但冯福根、吴林江(2001)的研究结果表明,重组当年和重组后第一年的上市公司业绩得到了一定程度的提升,表明并购后公司的第一年业绩较好,但在并购后的第二年业绩就出现了明显下降。 


2. Economic consequences of Lenovo's acquisition: empirical evidence from the capital market2.联想并购的经济后果:来自于资本市场的经验证据 

备受世人注目的联想并购成为我国海外收购金额最大的案例,同时也为2004年的中国并购潮划上了圆满的句号。为此,联想成功跻身全球PC行业三甲。对此,国内外媒体都表示了极大的关注①,持怀疑态度的声音也不绝入耳。面对资金、管理、文化及市场等现实问题,对于希望跨入世界市场联想而言,一切才刚刚开始。 

The notable acquisition of Lenovo is the biggest overseas acquisition case. And it also draws a successful close for Chinese overseas acquisition wave in 2004. Therefore, Lenovo has been rank among the top three in global PC industry. To it, freign media have expressed great concern①, while skeptical voices continued. Facing to many realities problems such as capital, management and culture problem, to Lenovo who hopes to enter into world market, this is just the beginning.

We know that it didn’t have successful merger case in the computer industry for a very long time. It seems still too early to give a conclusion that the merger between Lenovo and IBM has escaped from the failure fate. Then, we might take a look at the capital market from the empirical data as well, and we may make a further analysis of the changes after Lenovo’s acqusition. 我们知道,计算机行业也已经在很长的时间里没有过成功的并购案例了,联想和IBM之间的并购交易能否逃出整合失败的宿命,暂时给以定论似乎为时过早。那么,我们不妨先看看来自于资本市场的经验数据,我们可以通过这些经验的数据进一步分析联想并购前后的变化。 

① In despite of doubts exist about Lenovo’s surplus management affect the reliability of financial information, professor Chenxiao’s demonstrately research shows that surplus statements of Chinese listed companies still content many information despite of accounting data often be manipulated. In addition, profit manipulateion only take a phasic impact to financial statements from long-term, and the essential effect of merger and acquisition will be reflected by financial statements in definite term. Thereby, the method to use financial inidcators to annalize merger effect has gradually been accepted and ratified in merger performance studies. ① 尽管有人怀疑联想存在盈余管理行为而影响财务数据的可靠性,但陈晓教授的实证研究表明,尽管会计数据经常会被操纵,中国上市公司报表盈余数字仍然具有很强的信息含量。此外,从长期角度来看,利润操纵手段只会对财务报表产生阶段性的影响,而并购交易的实质影响最终会在一定的期间内在财务报表中得到反应。因此,在研究并购绩效时,利用财务指标研究分析并购的效应也逐渐得到了接受和认可。 

① The British "Guardian" has published an article and said that Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's personal computer business will open China’s new economic era, marked that Chinese companies are truly starting to enter into the era of globalization acquisition. Investors Chuck Jones of Stein Roe Investment Advisory Company believes if Lenovo wants to play an important role in the world, the acquisition of IBM's PC division is an effective way to achieve such purpose. Otherwise, Lenovo has to pay 10 years of efforts at least.① 英国《卫报》曾发表文章认为联想收购IBM个人电脑业务将开启中国的新经济时代,标志着中国公司开始真正进入了全球化并购的时代。Stein Roe投资咨询公司的投资商Chuck Jones认为,如果联想欲成为世界舞台上扮演重要角色,收购IBM的PC部门就是实现这种目的的有效方式。否则,联想至少还得为此付出十年的努力


2.1 The “Running loss” of Lenovo in principle market: descriptive validation from the capital market2.1 联想“跑输”大市:来自于资本市场描述性的验证 

首先,我们有必要整体回顾一下联想股票价格长期走势。下图中清晰地描述了联想在[2/1994,10/2005]期间股票价格变动趋势。2004年12月8日,联想宣布了并购IBM个人电脑业务的交易后,联想的股价出现了大幅的下降。2004年12月9日开盘联想股价便一度急升,最高涨幅曾达到了7.4%,但此后,联想股价表现有些差强人意,联想股票报收于2.575港元,较上一交易日跌幅为3.74%,比并购宣布前降低了15%,这主要是投资者仍然看淡联想的并购交易前景。除了担心并购后会迫于资金的压力,联想采取冒进的融资手段,如寻求发行新股募集急需资金,增发的直接后果是将摊薄联想现有股东的利润,会引发市场连锁的负面影响;同时,还担心联想的整合能力与盈利能力。 


First, we need to review totally the long-term trend of the price of Lenovo’s stock. The fig. below clearly describes trend of the price of Lenovo’s stock during February, 1994 and October, 2005. The price of Lenovo's stock declines dramatic when Lenovo announced it has merged IBM's PC business on December 8, 2004. The price of Lenovo’s stock was once soaring on December 9, 2004, the open day, with a maximum increase of 7.4%. But after this, the performance of Lenovo’s stock is just passable, the price closed at 2.575 Hong Kong dollars, 3.74% decrease than before exchange day and 15% lower than before announcement of M&A. The main reason is that the investors still doubt Lenovo's M&A prospects. They afraid that Lenovo will take radical means of financing under pressure of lack of capital, such as to raise rush capital by seeking to issue new stocks, which direct result is to dilute existing shareholders’ profits and trigger a chain reaction of negative market impact. Additionally, they also doubt about Lenovo’s integration ability and profitablility.有大量的研究表明,收购,尤其是国际化的收购,对收购者来说蕴藏风险,一是信息不对称导致估价失真,另外则是收购后的整合变数更多③。联想重金收购IBM PC业务的跨国收购成为中国企业走出去的一个范本,他能否幸免于“赢家诅咒”,虽然事件已经过了一年半,但在这个时空纬度下,研究联想收购的经济后果,以期能够找出揭示这一悬念的证据,这是本文研究的重要目的。

其次,通过对比分析上表中的描述性数据,我们能够看出,[12/8/2004,1/31/2005]期间,联想股票跌幅达到了21.5%,与方正(HK.0448)跌幅-12.11%和恒生指数-2.14%的跌幅相比,我们能够清晰地看出投资者对联想并购交易的前景信心不足。 

    A large number of studies show that the buyers run a risk in acquistion, in particular international acquisitions. First, inconsistent information lead to distortion of valuation, in addition, there are more changes company integration after the acquisition③. Lenovo's cross national acquisition of IBM's PC business has become a model for China’s enterprises to go out. This paper research the economic consequences of Lenovo’s M&A so as to found evdence to test that if it can escape from “winner curse” though the M&A passed one year. This is the important purpose of this paper.最后,下图显示了[6/30/2004,1/31/2005]期间联想股价和恒生指数变动趋势,我们能够发现,自2004年1月开始,联想股票收益开始落后恒生股指的收益。在宣布并购交易后,显而易见,联想明显跑输“大市”。简单而言,出现这一经济后果的原因在于并购交易。 

 Second, after analyze the descriptive data in the fig. Above, we can find that during December 8, 2004 and January 31, 2005, the decrease rate of price of Lenove’s stock reaches 21.5%, compared with -12.11% of Founder(HK. 0448) and -2.14% of Hang Seng Index, we can clearly find that the investors are lack of trust in Lenovo’s M&A prospect. 2.2 联想逃离了赢家诅咒吗①?来自资本市场经验数据的进一步研究 

在进行研究之前,我们假设市场能够反应信息,股票价格可以反应所有公开的信息,价格的变化包含了公司大部分的信息。基于信息效率市场理论,我们可以通过分析事件发生期间价格的变化和超额收益率来评价并购事件产生的影响程度。下面,我们将通过计算联想的超额收益率整体情况来进一步判断并购对联想产生的经济后果。 

Last, the fig. below shows the change trend of Lenovo’s stock and Hang Seng Index during June 30, 2004 and January 31, 2005. We find in the fig. that Lenovo stock proceeds start to fall behind Hang Seng index gains from January, 2004. It’s obviously that Lenovo is “running loss” in the principle market after announcement of M&A. In short, the economic consequences arise because of the M&A.


2.2 Does Lenovo escape from winners curse ①? Further study from the Empirical data of capital market 

Before the course of the study, we assume that market reaction to information and all public information can be responded by stock prices whose changes include most of the company’s information. Based on Information efficient market theory, we can evaluate the reflect level of merger event through analyzing the changes in prices and abnormal excess return rate during the merger event course. Next, we will make a further estimation about the economic consequences after merger and acquisition through calculate the whole abnormal excess return rate of Lenovo.

Some studies show that, merger news usually be leaked to investors before it happened. As a result, if the event window is too small, the early reactions of merger event in the market will be missed; if the window if too large, it will pass fish eyes for pearls and strong effect associated with the merger event will not be acquired. Based on both sides of Lenovo and IBM’s good confidential work, additional to Lenovo Close after four days for importance events before notice to public, we then defined the day Lenovo announced the merger event (i.e. December 8, 2004) as benchmark time. The [0, +4] will be take as event window, that is [12 / 8 / 2004,12 / 12/2004].有研究结果显示,并购消息通常会在事前泄露给投资者。所以,如果事件窗口过小,就会错过并购事件早期的市场反应,窗口过大则会鱼目混珠,无法得到与并购事件相关性很强的效应。基于联想和IBM双方保密工作到位,及联想公告前因重大事件停盘4天,因此,我们将联想2004年12月8日宣布并购定义为事件发生基准时间,将以[0,+4]作为事件窗口,即[12/8/2004,12/12/2004]。 

我们利用[4/1/2004,8/25/2004]作为正常回报率的估计期间,计算出联想相对于恒生指数的回归方程,mtitRR719135.100125.0+−=。根据计算,我们得到了联想在[12/8/2004,12/14/2004]期间的超额回报率均值为-0.39%,累计超额回报率为-11.702%

 We use [4/1/2004, 8/25/2004] as the estimate length of normal rate of return, the regression equation of Lenovo relative to the Hang Seng Index was calculated: The mtitRR719135.100125.0 + -=.

According to calculations, we obtain the average excess rate of return of Lenovo between the Legend of [12/8/2004,12/14/2004] is -0.39%, and the cumulative abnormal excess rate of return is -11.702%.


Table Regression results for Lenovo and the Hang Seng Index 


①A lot of historic merger cases results show that the deal winner is the highest bidder, however, the winners are not often laugh at last. It seems to become a "winner curse" lord of rings that wearing in the head of mergers corporations. In fact, Bein current global mergers and acquisitions business analysis data show that one year after the transaction announced, the average share price of mergers corporations will fall 12%. When evaluate the 105 domestic and cross-border mergers cases between 1998 and 2003, Bein found that between 12 months and 24 months after announced acquisition, about 60% of the transaction, the acquirer's stock price is lower than standard performance index; and only 14% of the transaction, the acquirer's stock price is higher than standard performance index more than 10%.① 历史上大量的并购案例结果表明,能够最终赢得交易的是出价最高者,但赢家却往往笑不到最后,这似乎成了并购企业戴在头上一条“赢家诅咒”(winner curse)魔戒。事实上,Bein目前的全球并购业务分析数据表明,交易宣布一年后,并购公司的平均股价一般比并购前下降12%。Bein在评估1998年到2003年完成的105笔国内和跨国并购案例时发现,近60%的交易,在并购宣布后的12个月和24个月里,收购方的股价表现低于标准指数,仅有14%的交易,收购方的股价表现比指数高10%以上。 

The following chart directly shows the daily rate of return, the daily abnormal excess return rate and the cumulative abnormal excess rate of return of Lenovo during [11/17/2004,12/15/2004]. We found that Lenovo failed to outperform the Hang Seng Index's overall earnings level during this period. Thus, we can judge, investors are taking a not optimistic expectedness about this mergers transaction which like “snake swallow elephant”.下图更直观地显示了[11/17/2004,12/15/2004]期间联想的日收益率、日超额收益率及累计超额收益率情况,我们发现联想在此期间没能跑赢恒生指数的整体收益水平。据此,我们基本可以判断,投资者对这起“蛇吞象”的并购交易前景持有不乐观的预期

Fig.  The trends chart of Lenovo stocks, the Hang Seng Index daily rate of return and Lenovo cumulative abnormal excess rate of return图 联想股票、恒生指数日收益率及联想超额及累计超额收益率趋势 

对交易对手IBM而言,是否出售PC的亏损包袱更加有利于轻装上阵呢?①下面,我们先看看其在资本市场上的表现。我们以并购交易宣布日12月8日为基准日以[10/10/2004,9/31/2004]窗口区间,根据市场模型计算出IBM相对于标准普尔指数的回归方程为:。计算结果显示,在[-20,+20]窗口期间IBM相对于标准普尔指数超额收益率为11.18%。在恒生指数与标准普尔指数相关性为正的前提下,相比联想超额收益率显著为-11.70%而言,双方博弈结果一目了然,联想处于明显的弱势。尽管交易价格是当时的静态均衡价格,但IBM出售PC业务却赢得了资本市场的首肯。 

表 IBM超额收益率情况汇总表 

To counter party IBM, whether to sell the loss-making PC burden more conducive without reservation? ① Next, we take a look at its capital markets performance. Take the day announced mergers (i.e. December 8) as a benchmark and take [10/10/2004, 9/31/2004] as window interval, according to the market model, The regression equation of IBM relative to Standard and Poor’s Composite index is calculate as :       . Calculations show that the abnormal excess rate of return of IBM to standard and Poor’s Composite index is 11.18% during [-20, +20] window interval.The relativity of Hang Seng Index and the Standard and Poor’s Composite index is plus. Compare to the abnormal excess rate of return of Lenovo -11.70%, the results of both game clear, and Lenovo is obviously vulnerable. Although the trade price was static equilibrium price, the sale of IBM's PC business has won the approval of the capital market.


Table The collect table of the abnormal excess rate of return of IBM


①On December 9, 2004, IBM (NYSE : IBM) shares in the New York Stock Exchange closed at 96.65 US dollars, it is 0.55 US dollars higher than the stock opening price, and showing a growth of 0.57%. The total volume is 5310700 shares.

Fig.  The trends chart of IBM shares, the Standard and Poor’s Composite Index daily rate of return, and IBM cumulative abnormal excess rate of return① 2004年12月9日IBM(NYSE:IBM)股票在纽交所报收于96.65美元,较开盘价上涨0.55美元,涨幅为0.57%,成交量为5310700股。 

图 IBM的股票、标准普尔指数日收益率以及IBM累计超额收益率趋势图 


For Lenovo, there is both opportunities and challenges. In the process of growth and maturity, Lenovo has never given up any efforts to find a business models that can perfect combination of products, customers and channels. To Lenovo, the Merger and acquisition of IBM's PC business is marked with the international breakthrough of the original business model. Lenovo is trying hard to syncretize IBM’s innovation ability and DELL’s marketing sense perfectly, and then expand Lenovo's Profit Opportunities.对联想而言,机遇与挑战并存。在成长壮大过程中,联想始终没有放弃努力寻找能将产品、客户和渠道完美结合的商业模式,并购IBM PC业务标志着联想正尝试用国际化的方式突围原有的商业模式,努力将IBM的创新能力与Dell市场开拓意识完美地糅合成一体,进而拓展联想的盈利想象空间。 

并购之后,为弥补缺乏国际市场开拓的经验,联想引入了三家国际投资机构①;为有助于董事会更具国际化的视野,联想为他们提供了三个董事会席位;在一定程度上,这些都有助于缓解外界对联想特色的本土企业文化会制约国际化进程的担忧②。有时,公司股票价格的表现能提前显示出公司的业绩变化,而有时候股票价格的表现则滞后于公司的业绩变化(Jeffrey Immelt,2006) ③。下面,我们将从财务、市场情况等指标中厘清联想并购的经济后果。 

After the merger, in order to compensate for the lack of international marketing experience, Lenovo introduced three international investment institutions ①; To help the board more international perspective, Lenovo provide them three board seats; To some extent, all these measures will help to ease the external worry that the local Corporate culture of Lenovo may be restricted to the process of internationalization.②; Sometimes, the status of a company’s stock price can show before the changes of cooperation’s outstanding achievement. While sometimes the status of stock price is lagged behind the changes of the cooperation’s outstanding achievement (Jeffrey Immelt, 2006) ③. In the following text, we will clarify the economic consequences for Lenovo’s mergers and acquisition from the index of finance, market conditions and etc.


3 study of M&A economic consequences: Empirical evidence from financial index and non-financial index3 并购经济后果研究:来自财务与非财务指标的经验证据 为清楚厘清并购的经济后果④,我们选择2005年4月30日(交割时间)作为参照坐标,对比分析前后各季指标的变化趋势。


Acquisition economic consequences research: from financial and to clearly clarified acquisition ④ the economic consequences, we chose April 30, 2005 (delivery time) as a reference coordinates, and comparative analysis of the quarter before and after the change in trend indicators


3.1 Competitive continued to decline: from the number of financial indicators empirical evidence According the prospects the Board ⑤ described,We use quarterly financial index data to verify it. It is in order to check whether Lenovo reached the desired objectives in the near future of merger and acquisition.3.1 竞争能力持续下降:来自多财务指标的经验证据 我们据此对董事会描述⑤的前景,利用季度财务指标的数据进行实证检验,以便进一步看看联想的并购在短期内是否达到了这些预期的目标? 

为对比分析联想并购效应,下文主要从四个维度进行考察,即盈利能力、现金产生能力、偿债能力(稳健性)及营运能力。 

In the following text, comparative analyzing the effect of Lenovo's merger and acquisition, we will analysis from four aspect, namely profitability, cash generation capacity, solvency (stability) and operational ability.

①At 0:00 a.m. on March 31, 2005, Lenovo Group’s (0992.HK) financing plan was approved by the stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK).Texas Pacific Set 347 million US dollars as additional investment, the Texas Pacific Group invest 200 million US dollars, the General Atlantic investment 100 million US dollars and the America Newbridge Capital Group investment 50 million US dollars. In this agreement, Lenovo Group will issue a total of 2,730 thousand shares of non-listed Class A cumulative convertible preferred share to Texas Pacific Group, General Atlantic and America Newbridge Capital Group. Each share issued at a price of 1,000 Hong Kong dollars. Lenovo also issue about 237 million shares of Lenovo's non-listed shares warrants which can be used as a subscription to them. The agreement also provides that such preferred stock will receive 4.5% of the annual fixed cumulative preferential cash dividend (paid quarterly), and after the deal was completed in the seventh year, Lenovo or preferred stock holders can redeem at any time. These preference shares will be convertible into 1,001,834,862 common Lenovo share with a conversion price of 2.725 Hong Kong dollars. Up to March 24, 2005, the average closing price of Lenovo Group’s common stock was 2.335 Hong Kong dollars for 30 trading days.  The conversion price, according to the agreement, overflow 16.7% here, and each warrant can subscribe one ordinary share with 2.725 Hong Kong dollars per share and the warrants are valid for five years.


②Firstly, the three investment agencies well understand the IT industry, particularly in understanding IBM's PC business, and they maintain Lenovo integration and strategic direction basically the same views, which helps to better clarify Lenovo’s future strategy; Secondly, the three investment companies have rich experience in mergers and acquisitions and integration, it will be helpful to smooth integration of Lenovo; Again, they will actively introduce the new Lenovo to global investors. 

It is helpful for new Lenovo to communicate and cooperate with other investors when people have a profound awareness and understanding of Lenovo.


④ In 1997, Boeing got into a complex integration and financial crisis after merge McDonnell. While rival Airbus took the opportunity to grab market share and by the end of 1999, it gulp down 48% of global contract for delivery and become the biggest civilian aircraft manufacturers replace McDonnell in 2003. In 2002,HP merge Compaq, HP and Compaq enough, not only did not achieve the expected growth performance, the market share is actually shrinking.  Before M&A, Compaq’s PC market is better than Dell, while after the acquisition, new HP direct give its PC business Champion cup to Dell.

⑤ According to “expanded the business prospects of the Group” described in the letter of Lenovo directorate before the mergers, the Lenovo's acquisition will further build the Lenovo brand, better commitment to innovation, and better sales and further reduce costs.① 2005年3月31日凌晨零点,香港联交所批准了联想集团(0992.HK)的融资计划,德克萨斯太平洋集3.47亿美元的新增投资中,德克萨斯太平洋集团投资2亿美元,General Atlantic投资1亿美元,美国新桥投资集团投资5000万美元。协议规定,联想集团将向德克萨斯太平洋集团、General Atlantic、美国新桥投资集团发行共273万股非上市A类累积可换股优先股,每股发行价为1000港元,以及可用作认购约2.37亿股联想股份的非上市认股权证。协议还规定,这些优先股将获得每年4.5%的固定累积优先现金股息(按季度支付),在交易完成后的第七年起,联想或优先股持有人可随时赎回。这些优先股共可转换成1001834862股联想普通股,转换价格为每股2.725港元。截至2005年3月24日,联想集团普通股连续30个交易日平均收市价为2.335港元,根据协议规定的转换价格较此溢价16.7%,则每份认股权证可按每股2.725港元认购1股普通股,认股权证有效期为5年。 

② 首先,这三家投资机构非常了解IT行业,尤其了解IBM的PC业务,并保持与联想在整合和战略方向意见基本一致,这有助于联想更好地厘清未的来战略;其次,这三大投资公司有着丰富的并购和整合经验,这对联想顺利完成整合有很大的帮助;再次,他们也会积极向全球的投资者推销新联想,对联想的深刻认识和理解将会帮助新联想与其他投资人去沟通和合作。 

③  

④ 1997年,波音并购麦道后陷入复杂的整合和财务危机中,而竞争对手空客趁机抢夺市场份额,1999年底吞掉了全球交付合同额的48%,2003年取代麦道成为民用飞机的最大制造商。2002年惠普并够康复后,不仅业绩没有实现增长的期望,市场份额反而出现萎缩,并购前康柏就能压倒戴尔,而并购后的新惠普却将PC冠军宝座拱手让给了戴尔。 

⑤ 根据联想董事会在并购前“经扩大集团的业务前景”函件中描述,联想的并购可以进一步打造联想品牌、更好地致力于创新、加强销售力度、进一步降低成本。 

 

Table. The changes of financial index table before and after Lenovo's acquisition

In the four quarter after Lenovo’s delivery, despite only from the financial trends of the changes may not be able to fully reflect the effect of mergers and acquisitions, but we can still convinced acquisition have a great negative impact to Lenovo.表 联想并购前后财务指标变化综合表

从联想交割日之后的四个季度里,尽管单纯从财务指标的变化趋势未必能完全反应出并购的效应,但是,我们还是能够确信并购对联想产生了很大的负面影响。


3.1.1 Profitability continued to decline: from further decomposition of DuPont indicators 

3.1.1 盈利能力持续下降:来自杜邦指标的进一步分解 

首先,从盈利能力角度来看,截止2005年底的前三季度,联想营业额高达791.73亿元,股东的应占溢利较上年同期9.54亿元增长12.8%达港币10.76亿元,每股基本盈利及每股摊薄盈利较去年同期分别下降4.5%和5.1%;而联想并购后第四季度每股基本盈利较第一季度下降了352.42%;净资产收益率下降了316.38%。这些都导致股价下跌,股东财富也因此而损耗。 

下面,我们通过杜邦指标来进一步分析股东财富的减少的真正原因(见下表)。我们发现,影响权益净利润的三个主要因素中,并购后的第四季度较第一季度销售净利润率的降幅仅高达2倍,同样,资产周转率降副达22.06%,权益乘数由于资产负债率的提高表现出了明显的增高趋势。 

从目前情况来看,销售净利润降幅大都高于净资产利润率的降幅(见下图),而销售净利润的降低更多是因为无法完全消化亏损严重的IBM PC业务所致。除大中华地区以外的地区都出现了亏损,进一步稀释了联想的整体盈利能力。除了要负重前行之外,还更要通过资本市场上苛刻的季度性测试,对联想而言,这无疑是生死攸关的大考。联想第三季度盈利只有.81亿港币,并且还低于第二季度的利润,净利率已低至1.8%,事实上这已经低于分析师的预期①

 First, on view of profitability, in the first three quarters by the end of 2005, Lenovo turnover reaches 79.173 billion yuan, and the benefit of the shareholders reaches 1.076 billion Hong Kong dollars with 12.8% increase rate from 954 million HK. Dollars in the same term last year, and basic earnings per share and diluted earnings per share decreased 4.5% and 5.1% respectively in the same term last year. But the basic earnings per share in the fourth quarter after acquisition decreased by 352.42%,and net assets yield fell by 316.38%, compared with the first quarter, which cause to loss in the price of stock and shareholders wealth.


Next, we adopted DuPont indicators to further analyze the real reasons that cause wealth of shareholders to reduce (see fig. below). We found that retained profits rate in the fourth quarter after the acquisition reduced by 2 times than it in the first quarter, at the same time, capital turnover rate reduced by 22.06%, interest rates liabilities rate increased obviously due to capital liabilities rate increased.

    Judging from the current situation, net sales profits rate declined more than net capital profits (see fig. below), and net sales profits declined mostly because of it can not fully digest IBM's PC business in bad losses. All regions except Great China have suffered a loss so as to further dilute Lenovo's overall profitability. It is a vital exam that the Lenovo must to pass the rigorous quarterly test in capital market beside seek for development with heavy bear. Lenovo’s profit in the third quarter is only 8.1 billion Hong Kong dollars which is lower than it in the second quarter, with a lower net interest rate of 1.8%, which is less than what analysts expected ①. 


Change trends chart of fiscal yearly net interest rate and net sales rate of change trends

    From the change trend of ring rate of gross margin and the main business profit, the ring rate of every quarter after acquisition has a negative growth (see fig. below). Although the gross margin in the first quarter after acquisition rose by 2% compared to it in the same time last year, it reduced more than 3 million Hong Kong dollars compared to it in the quarter before, mainly because of operating costs went up by 39.2% to 3.2 billion Hong Kong dollars, amortization of intangible assets and compensation grew by more than 50% to 263 million Hong Kong dollar, the interest rate of main business in the fourth quarter after acquisition reduced by 1.439 times than it in before one quarter, and the cost margins in the fourth quarter of 2005/06 even is as low as -3.6%. Thereby, the anticipatory cost savings before acquisition will not come into true on time. 

    To Lenovo, the most key problem is how to implement Profitable growth strategy, and how to achieve the synergies in short time so as to realize the promising prospects described in directorate’s communicating mails. To better integrate the PC business after acquisition, the performance of Lenovo, up to now, still can not please its shareholders and investors. 

Fig.: The ring changes of Lenovo’s quarterly financial indicators

Below, we make a further analysis on the influence factors to net sales profit change, including cost of sales, administrative costs and financial costs. These factors have experienced various degrees of significant growth (see fig. below).

Fig.: The Costs of Lenovo before and after acquisition

    Although the scale of Lenovo after acquisition ranks the third top in the world, it is still not comparable to Dell and HP in market. Dell’s net profit in the fourth quarter of 2005① reaches highly 1.01 billion US dollars with EPS 43 US cents while Lenovo’s net profit in the third quarter of 2005/06 is only 374 million Hong Kong dollars though with a growth by 12% than the second quarter, and the change from IAS handling business reputation② has effectively eased Lenovo’s short-term earnings pressure. It still has a long way to go for Lenovo who only have net profit of 1.8% up to now to not only further improve service level but also need to increase earning ability in facing of high operating costs and promotional costs in overseas markets. Meanwhile, it sends Lenovo a negative signal that Dell, with low-cost and low-price strategy, is also faced with decline trend in profit margin③. 

① The following figure is the quarterly data of HP and DELL. From it we can find that Lenovo’s net interest rate is far lower than its competitor. 

② Hong Kong adopted IFRS No. 3, Hong Kong Accounting Standards No. 36 and the Hong Kong Accounting Standards No. 38, which led to accounting policy of Goodwill changes. As of March 31, 2005 only, goodwill is: make amortization in accordance with the straight-line method based on the 3-10 year ranging, and evaluate devalue in each settlement day. Under IFRS No. 3: Lenovo ceased of amortization goodwill on April 1, 2005. From March 31, 2006 for the year, goodwill is required to make impairment calculations yearly and when there are signs of impairment. The total value of Lenovo's acquisition transactions is approximately 1.75 billion US dollars. The acquisition produces a business reputation of 895,278,000 HK dollars due to synergies though business reputation will not be straightly amortized by fixed number of year of use according to Hong Kong's new accounting standards.

③ The Chinese have an old saying, "derives, in between them; From these, they would have only its next". To the Lenovo who want learn DELL’s operation model, it is self-evident that the earnings pressure of low-cost operation model is heavy. From 2003 to 2005, Dell’s research inputs accounted for 1.12%, 0.94% and 0.83% of revenue taking respectively. On March 21, 2006, Dell shows that the income in the second quarter is lower than what they expected, so, the price of Eell’s stock fall by 10%, the price of each share is 19.91 US dollars, actual turnover is 14 billion US dollars, 200 million US dollars lower than what expected. In addition, Dell starts to change their simple sale method of telephone and direct manner, and opened two retail stores in Dallas and New York in 2006.

3.1.2 Solvency decreasing: further analysis from Z model

    On view of the cash production ability in the first to fourth quarter in 2005/06, profit pressure will no doubt further enlarge Lenovo's financial risks and hidden dangers. On view of steadiness, the merged Lenovo’s interest protection multiples reduced by 98.7% in 05/06 compared to it in the first quarter of 04/05, and the quick ratio in the third quarter of 05/06 reduced by 44.37% compared to it in the fourth quarter of 04/05. We found that the main economic consequence of this "essay" acquisition is of directly exacerbate weakening the solvency of Lenovo, and and dramatically enlarged Lenovo's financial risks.

    Based on this, the following will directly use Z model① to test the risk of insolvency that Lenovo is facing with. According to Z model calculation, we found that Lenovo’s Z value shows a trend of straightly quarterly decline from the first to fourth quarter of 2004/05(see the fig. below), even with a decline rate of 93.8%. This trend is the same as it of solvency decreasing mentioned above.

Fig.: The quarterly Z value calculated results of fiscal year 2004/05 to 2005/06

    As we know, Lenovo’s Z values in the second, third and fourth quarter of 2005/06 are all less than 1.21 (see fig. below). And according to Altman’s estimation, we can conclude that Lenovo has going to bankrupt. Despite this conclusion is an alarmism, we can at least have sufficient reason to believe that, one of economic consequence is that Lenovo's acquisition directly enlarged its financial risk, according to Atlman’s researches.

① Z model brought forward by famous finance professor Edward I. Altman of New York University in 1968, and on the basis, Altman had amended it again in 2000. The amended model is: Z=0.717ⅹ1+0.847ⅹ2+3.107ⅹ3+0.420ⅹ4+0.998ⅹ5, ⅹ1=working capital/general asset; ⅹ2= Retained earnings/general asset; ⅹ3=Pre-tax profit/general asset; ⅹ4= interests of the shareholders book value/ book value of total liabilities; ⅹ5=taking/general asset. Using this indicator, Altman researched two set companies as 33 operating and bankrupt companies, he found: firstly, average of Z value in the bankrupt companies is 0.15 and it in operating companies is 4.14. Secondly, the Z<1.21 is bankrupt company, Z>2.90 is operating company, and part of the Z∈[1.23,2.90] are bankrupt companies and part of them are operating companies. Thirdly, the insolvent forecast accuracy rate of using Z-value is of 91%, and the operating forecast accuracy rate of it is of 97%.

In fact, the effectiveness of Hong Kong capital market is as good as it of United State capital market, so this paper can directly use the Z-model that be established on empirical data of U.S. market.

Fig.  Annual financial indicators and change trend of Z-values in 2004/05—2005/06

We do a comparison and analysis on Lenovo’s loans below. The interest of the shareholders is of 5.204 billion yuan, the long-term and current liabilities is of 3.804 billion yuan on March 31, 2005. By September 30, Lenovo’s outstanding regular loans① is 3.9 billion Hong Kong dollars, and loans interest rate are 0.42, compared to total interest of  9.28 billion Hong Kong dollars. Although Lenovo has no period financial leasehold assets, the interest of the shareholders is of 9.386 billion yuan, the long-term and current liabilities is of 36.605 yuan with liquidity ratio of 1.01 on December 31. The outstanding regular loans are 3.791 billion Hong Kong dollars and short-term bank borrowing is 62 million yuan, rate between loans and interest is 0.41 by December 31 ②.

On March 31, 2006, the interests of shareholders is of 142 million Hong Kong dollars, long-term and current liabilities is of 31.168 billion Hong Kong dollars and the outstanding regular bank loans are 780 million Hong Kong dollars and short-term bank loans are 1.001 billion Hong Kong dollars③, with ratio of 0.22 compared to total interest 8.148 billion Hong Kong dollars.


Fig.: Contrast between liquidity ratio and loan interests of Lenovo


① on April 26, 2005, Lenovo and syndicated signed a regular loan and revolving loan financing with a total of 600 million US dollars, and the loan interest is LIBOR plus 0.825%. The loans must be repaid in five years by manner of installments.


② In the first three quarters of2005/06, Lenovo paid 650 million US dollars in cash for acquisition, and the remaining 540 million Hong Kong dollar capital expenditures included the fixed assets bought, projects in progress and optimization of office information systems.

③ Although Lenovo has obtained a regular loan and revolving loan of 400 million US dollars on March 13, 2006 from the syndicated(about 3.12 billion Hong Kong dollars), with loan interest as LIBOR plus 0.52%, it also has got a 5-year fixed rate loans of 100 million US dollars of loans (about 780 million Hong Kong dollars ) from domestic policy bank, which are used to replace the acquisition loans acquired by acquisition of IBM's PC business in May, 2005.

Note: dividends* shows that it is not necessary to repay the preferred stock dividends and related financial costs within five years. 


Fig.: The gather of Lenovo loans and preferred stock dividends.


Note: * indicates that it is not necessary to fully repay the convertible preferred stock dividends and related financial costs within five years.

The ratio between financial cost and after-tax profits changed from 0.06% in 02/03 to 21.59% in the fourth quarter of 05/06. To the present profitability, it is obvious that Lenovo's debt-servicing capacity and pressure is not good. 

Lenovo financial cost for the change in the proportion of after-tax profits table

3.1.3 Funding ends: further analysis on cash flow 

The manage concept of "cash is king" has become the consensus. Now, we analyze Lenovo's financial predicament from perspective of funds. On December 31, 2005, Lenovo’s cash and the equivalent is 13.41 billion Hong Kong dollars, but the balance of it is 7.838 billion Hong Kong dollars in the fourth quarter (3/31/2006) of 05/06, with a decrease rate of 41.5 %. From this perspective, the decrease rate of usable capital is much great, and the funding ends to Lenovo.

① Lenovo under 1,000 yuan a share issue 2.73 million shares of convertible preferred stock and may subscribe for 2,730,000 shares of non-listed warrants, the total cash cost of 2.73 billion Hong Kong dollars.


Fig.: The change trend of absolute number of annual financial cash and the equivalent in 2004/05-2005/06


We can find from the fig. below that Lenovo’s cash and the equivalent in the fourth quarter of 05/06 is -5.641 billion yuan. It is the first to appear deficit as -2.591 billion yuan after acquisition, the financing net cash even is -2.652 billion yuan, and investment spending is 397 million yuan. Therefore, we can not avoid facing Lenovo’s plight of the capital pressure.

Fig.: The change trend of various activities capital annually in 2004/5-2005/06 

Now we make a study on the structure of currency kinds. The balance of cash and the equivalent of 3.019 billion yuan on March 31, 2005 include Hong Kong dollars accounting for 0.8%, US dollars accounting for 42% and RMB yuan accounting for 57.2%. It of 13.11 billion yuan includes on December 31 include US dollars accounting for 40.2%, RMB yuan accounting for 37.8%, euro accounting for 6.4%, Yen accounting for 3% and Hong Kong dollars accounting for 12.6%. It of 7.84 billion yuan on March 31, 2006 include US dollars accounting for 36.7%, euro accounting for 7.3%, yen accounting for 5 .5% and Hong Kong dollars and the other accounting for 17.5%. Beside have a negative impact on cash,this structure settled in the fourth quarter have an positive impact of 6924.7 Hong Kong dollars on Lenovo's net cash flow. However, changes in the exchange rate are a double-edged sword. The balance of benefits and risks settled in this structure still has a large risk to Lenovo’s cash and profit.

From the perspective of Lenovo’s available credit, we found that Lenovo’s available credit amount is 3.275 billion yuan on March 31, 2005, including 1.473 billion Hong Kong dollars as amount of trade credit and credit loans, 740 million Hong Kong dollars as short-term and recycling cash overdraft, and 1.062 million Hong Kong dollars as foreign exchange contracts and options. By March 31, 2005, it has used 342 million yuan of trade credit and credit loans and 94 million yuan of foreign exchange contracts and options. The available credit loans amount is 12.092 billion Hong Kong dollars on December 31, 2005, including Hong Kong dollar 2.188 billion of amount of trade credit and credit loans, Hong Kong dollar 1.18 billion of short-term and recycling cash overdraft, and Hong Kong dollar8.724 billion long-term foreign exchange contracts and the derivatives. But it has used 402 million Hong Kong dollars of amount of trade and credit loans and 4.587 billion yuan of long-term foreign exchange contracts and the derivatives.

Fig.: The changes in Lenovo’s available credit amount

Through the above analysis, we found that Lenovo is facing with a continual drop in capital benefit and gradually serious capital pressure. If earnings continue to spur the case, risks and potential problems of capital security will be completely exposed. If Lenovo can fully understand and estimate the risk factors the funds link is facing with, and in fair weather prepare for foul, it will have chance to break the deadlock early①. However, it is the key if Lenovo can easily deal with the pressure of benefit and funds for it to successfully pass the vital integration period. 


3.1.3 Integration outlook worries②: Further analysis on operational efficiency

     At last, from the perspective of operational capability, it experienced to decrease to various extents after acquisition in the four quarters. And inventory turnover rate dropped from 11.59 to 6.71 in the fourth quarter. Although inventory turnover rapid is related to company’s sale strategy, it is more related to slow integration progress of Lenovo's global internal and external supply chain for the response rapid of supply chain directly impact its realization outlook of low-cost sales strategy. Faced with fierce competition, efficient logistics links is a winning recipe ③.

    After acquisition, Lenovo’s main business profit margins in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005/06 dropped by 66.95% from the first quarter of 2004/05. The main business profitability experienced significant decline (see fig. below). Lenovo's R & D investment only account for 1.68% of taking in 05/06, many core components of PC technology are bought, motherboards are mainly bought from Intel/AMD, and operating systems are mainly Microsoft windows. When components and system design are fully depend on external companies to provide, it must rely on internal reforms to improve operational efficiency. 

Fig.: Change trend of major operating business profit margin in each quarter before and after acquisition

    In a word, from the change trend of the four indicators mentioned above, we can find that Lenovo still doesn’t show the real merger synergies. Although Lenovo’s executives have sufficient patience to wait for the turnaround, patience of the capital market is very limited. We also found that Lenovo's economic consequences of acquisition runs counter to Fenggenfu and Wujianglin’ research (2001) conclusion (has better performance in the first year after M & A).

 

① According to the investigation of the International Federation of CFO (IAFEI) on the 321 listed companies in New York, we found that each large enterprise who abide by SOX Act has expended an average total cost of over 4.60 million dollars to implement clause 404 in the first year, and the company with 5 billion dollars need cost 8 million dollars. The cost on abiding by GE is as high as 30 million dollars. Maxuezheng, CEO of Lenovo denied that Lenovo will list in New York in previous interview.

② On September 11, 2006, Lenovo has been drawn from Hong Kong blue chips.

③ During  2001-2003, the low-cost leader Dell's inventory velocity lead to dropped to 4、3、3 days, while Lenovo’ is 25,23,25 days. 


 

3.2 Market expansion is just passable: experience data from the financial and non-financial 

Lenovo market performance after the acquisition① didn’t suffer a large fall like what the crepehanger expected, didn’t suffer “Waterloo”, i.e. 1+1≤2. This can be summarized in the following two reasons. On the one hand, Lenovo and IBM PC do not have the same customers so there is no phenomenon of revenue attrition, and also PC industry has the best shipment record and market growth in recent years. On the other hand, the effect acquisition has a hysteresis. As we all know, big clients’ order often exist longer delay effect and it need a long time for them to change supplier, so the big business don’t be impacted temporarily. In the retail channel, Lenovo use IBM's brand name will not immediately change the IBM faithful consumers’ buying preferences due to asymmetrical information.

We found that Lenovo’s operating income ring growth is relatively stable in fiscal year of 1998 to 2001, but it obviously slowdown during 2001 and 2005.

Table: Status of Lenovo’s operating income ring growth in fiscal year of 1998 to 2005

    However, the operating income ring growth in the four quarters after acquisition is [45.28%,9.02%,-21.53%], compared to it in the four quarters before acquisition as [-3.8%,11.57%,-25.29%]. Of course, discrete degree of ring growth after M&A is greater than before, which shows that Lenovo has a much great market development risks in recent.

After integration of IBM technology and brand, Lenovo can develop international market by fully using IBM's channels, sales, customer service and innovative financial influence②. Although Lenovo has a sales revenues of 31.065 billion Hong Kong dollars in the second quarter of fiscal year 05/06, with a growth of 7.4% compared to the first quarter, it still did not win the major market compared to global PC shipments actual growth of 15%.

In the following text, Lenovo's market position was analyzed combined with the global competitors. From the view point of market share, we can see that the global market share of Lenovo have a very obvious gap with rival Dell and HP. View from the increase rate, the market share growth rate of Acer ④ was well ahead of Lenovo. Thus, after the merger, the market position of Lenovo has become extremely embarrassed. In the mess of “surrounding and blocking up in front, chasing in back”, breaking the current market share will be the priority mission to Lenovo to achieve an international brand.

① The two cases of overseas M&A led by TCL president Lidongsheng, didn’t obtain their desired results and the so-called synergies. It still has no light of profitability at present, and industrial upgrading disrupted the TV business integration rhythm. On October 31, 2006 TCL Group and French Thomson issued a public notice that they will reorganize the joint venture company at the same time. And the next day, price of TCL stock rose by 9%. The handset business in domestic market has dropped, and the handset joint venture business established with Alcatel was dissolved in 2005. TCL’s integration didn’t obtain their desired results and the so-called synergies.

②At the beginning of Lenovo's acquisition, "Wall Street Journal" commented that the acquisition will enable IBM to become a loyal customer of Lenovo, while Lenovo can further explore new investment fields and future development space and scatter the geographical risk in operation as well.

③Since desktop and notebook computers were gradually extended in new market, consumers who has secondary purchase demand and turn to purchase laptop computers grew faster, global PC market was drived. In March 2006, IDC data showed that the global share of Lenovo’s PC shipments has dropped from 17.1% to 12.6%. 

④On November 2006, the media reported Acer may take the means like Lenovo's acquisition to achieve market share growth and brand internationalization.

 

Fig.: The shipment status of the four major global PC manufacturers

Note: The Fig. above is sorted out by author according to the released data of Gartner Dataquest released data.


Fig.: The market proportion status of four major global PC manufacturers

3.2.1 Glancing geographical profits: experience data from geographical sales

    It’s necessary for us to make a simple understand to the distribution and growth of global PC market share. We can find from the fig. below that EMEA, the United States and the Asia-Pacific region account for a global market share of 82.3%, while the former two account for the global market share of 62%. Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the EMEA region have growth as much as two-digit rate. Therefore, from amount and growth rate, the international Lenovo must become a competitive PC maker in these areas, or else it will be difficult for Lenovo to achieve its initial goal.


Table: comparison of global market shipment and market share

    According to the distribution and growth of global market share, we need to make a further analysis on market performance in different section. Indeed, Lenovo is not able to get enough market shares in important areas as EMEA and the United States, but also can not provide sufficient profit contribution. IDC statistics show PC sales in the United States grew by 11.7% in the second quarter of 2004/05, while Lenovo accounts for United States market by 4.1% ①, lower than late year’s 5.1%. Lenovo sell 611,000 PC, with a year-on-year decline by 8.4%, and annual growth rate dropped by 8%. Lenovo’s growth depends on ultimately the strong performance in the Greater China region.

    Now, we make a further understand of Lenovo’s earning performances in different regions. We can find that earnings from the Greater China accounts for more than 35%, and profit accounts for more than 67% in the first and second quarter of fiscal year 05/06. Earnings from the United States market account for 30%, and the loss and their earning proportion conflict clearly in the third and fourth quarter. Earnings proportion in EMEA, a faster grow region increased by 2.19%, but the loss amount increased by 157.4%. if try to enter the market by low-cost strategy, low-cost effect and profits pressure will be a large enough test to the fledgling Lenovo. 

Table comparison of turnover and its contribution of each region

Note: the contribution* doesn’t include business contribution from restructuring costs

We can find easily from the fig. below that Lenovo still mostly depends on the Greater China region after M&A, which is basically the same to before. If this situation continues, where are the M&A synergies of wealth creation and value growth for shareholders except an income growth from 

If this situation continues, then, in addition to total revenue due to a simple increase and the growth and the creation of wealth for shareholders and growth in the value of M & A synergies in there?

Table: comparison of turnover and its contribution of each region in fiscal year of 04/05-05/06

    Below, on view of Lenovo’s classical business, we make a study on Lenovo’s turnover in computers and handheld devices.

 

① Dell’s PC market share in United State is 34.7%18.7%, HP is 18.7%, GATEWAY ranks the third by 6%, Lenovo ranks the fifth by 4.1% with a decline by 0.1% than the first quarter.


 

    Contributions①: PC business is still the main revenue of Lenovo. And the share of PC business has grown from 80% to 93%, and handheld devices share has declined to about 4% after M&A. Therefore, from this point of view, we still think that Lenovo still need to continue to follow nuclear PC strategy ②.

Fig.: comparison of Lenovo’s classified revenues absolute value 

  Now, from occupation of classifying business resources and capital expenditure, occupation of PC resources after M&A accounts for above 87%, capital expenditure accounts for above 93%, but most profitability comes from handheld devices, while handheld devices resources occupy only 8% and its capital expenditure accounts for only about 3 to 4%. From this perspective, PC business after M&A didn’t bring enough profit contribution.

Table: Lenovo’s turnover and capital occupation of classifying business

    Lenovo has made a preparation of massive accumulation in the Greater China before M&A, it established 18 divisions, 110 networks and the sales proportion of merging big customers in the Greater China region has grown by 7.1% year-on-year. Lenovo made a good effect on the market by taking transaction and relationship-based sales model, grasped opportunity of 19% growth, and consolidated the sales in the Greater China region.

 

Lenovo financial report did not disclose the classified business profitable so that we are unable to analyze their profitability situation.

② Since performance is not reached, Yang Yuanqing admitted that there is mistake in Lenovo’s diversified strategy in the more than three years and initiatively reduce 50% of his annual salary, in the face of the confused employees, shareholders and investors’ questioned accountability. Subsequently, Lenovo start to contract front and returned to the PC business in early 2004. Lenovo introduced a three-year plan in early 2004,which core content is to contract front to return to PC business so as to ensure the growth of its major business, and to implemented a series of international marketing plans with Olympic TOP as the core to expand the overseas market.

 

In the first quarter of fiscal 2005/06①, market in the Greater China grow steadily with a growth in sales income by 35% to 7.9 billion Hong Kong dollars, mainly because that the domestic shipment of laptops has risen by 31%, and total shipment of personal computer has risen by 28% to 1.50 million units above. In the second quarter, the profit contribution in the Greater China still is the largest one, and the sales grew more than 28.5% to 10.2 billion HK dollars, shipment of PC rose by 29%, operating profit rose by 2.5% to 567 million HK dollars which accounting for69.7% of Lenovo total operating profits. Sale income in the third quarter increased by 5% than the second quarter, and market share reached 37%. From above mentioned we can know that sales in the Greater China accounted for only 37.37%, but it contributed 75.47% of the profits, so the Greater China region has become the major source of profit②, compared to 64.05% of the previous two quarters. 

Gartner disclosed on February 20, 2006 that PC shipments in Asia-Pacific region (excluding Japan) reached 41.7 million units in 2005, with a growth by 26.2% compared to 33.1 million units in 2004, and it achieved the highest growth rates since 2000, its domestic market share is of 33% which rank first top③.

Performance in American market ④ in the first quarter of 05/06 is common, and the sales income is 5.5 billion Hong Kong dollars, PC shipment in this region fell by 4% 825,000 units. But Brazil is the only bright spot in this region, and the PC shipments grew by 58% year-on-year. American market achieved income profit 249 million Hong Kong dollars, and its operating profit margin is about 4.5%. Sales income in the Middle East, Africa and Europe reached 3.7 billion Hong Kong dollars, and the PC shipment grew by 50%, while operating profit is of about 40 million Hong Kong dollars, with a margin of 1.1% only. The Asia-Pacific region (excluding Greater China region) had a loss in sales income which is 2.5 billion Hong Kong dollars. Although the Indian PC market shipments grew by 32%, overall PC shipments in the Asia-Pacific region still fell by 6% to 474,000 units due to weary performance in Japanese market. The loss in the Asia-Pacific region markets reached 29 million Hong Kong dollars in the first quarter of fiscal year 005/06.

    Before M&A, 90% of Lenovo’s revenue and profit contribution come from the Greater China region. After M&A, Lenovo has gradually a rudiment of international company though the regions from which the revenue come is dispersed so that it is helpful to decentralize business risks.

 

① Impacted by good performance in the first quarter of the fiscal year 04/05, Lenovo closed at 3.125 yuan in the Stock Exchange, with a rise margin of 10.6% as 0.3 Hong Kong dollar on August 1, 2005. But an analysis from Goldman Sachs thinks that Lenovo’s good performance benefited from the Greater China, especially from low-cost computer expand in county and the under markets. Goldman Sachs doesn’t have an optimistic attitude to Lenovo’s long-term profitability due to Lenovo’s "getting lost" in big market.

②It shows in Lenovo’s recent fiscal report of 06/07 that the same predicament has continued, i.e. overseas markets remained subdued. By August 31, Lenovo’s turnover was 3.7 billion US dollars and net income was of 38 million US dollars and cash reserves were of 990 million US dollars in the second quarter of 06/07. Turnover in China, Europe, Africa and Middle East has been on the rise. Sales in the Greater China rose by 25% and the operating income is 1.4 billion US dollars, accounting for 39% of group revenue. Sales in Europe, the Middle East and Africa rose by 5% and the revenue is of 751 million US dollars, accounting for 20% of the total. Sales in America were decreased by 9%, and revenue was 1.1 billion US dollars, accounting for 29% of the total. Lenovo’s notebook PC sales has grown by 9% and desktop computers by 4% compared with the same period of last year, and mobile phone sell best in domestic, but computer sales in America were decreased by 9%. Market share in America in the second quarter is 4.1%, with a decrease of 0.1 % compared to the first quarter while HP’s market share in America has increased by 1.5% compared to the first quarter. Net interest margin in Greater China region was 5.7%,it in Americas region was of -1.7%, it in Europe, Middle East and Africa region was of -1.1% and it in the Asia-Pacific region was of 0.5%.

Gartner data shows that in July-September 2006, the global PC industry market share, Lenovo accounts for 5.9%, Acer accounts for 5.7%, HP accounts for 16.3% and Dell accounts for 16.1% of the global PC market.

③ In the fourth quarter of05/06, Lenovo’s shipment in the Asia Pacific region is 7.80 million units with a growth margin of 28.6%, accounting for 18.7% of the market. While HP who ranks second only accounts for 10.6% of the market, and its competitors Founder Electronics’ shipment in China are 2.143 million units with growth of 45%, accounting for 11.1%. 

④ It will counter with great challenges to maintain Thinkpad brand in American market full of furious competition. Because the complex and diverse market structure makes the maintenance become very difficult. And Lenovo is still lack of selling techniques and experience before the changes of American market. On May 10, 2006 of Beijing time, Lenovo made a sales promotion of notebook PC Think in America in virtue of its first anniversary, including a type of notebook PC with price cut of 800 US dollars and the cut margin as 42%. This is the first large scale price cut in United State since the founding of Lenovo. The promotion pages in Lenovo official website America indicate that this promotion includes 6 type ThinPad T, X and Z series notebooks, 3 type ThinkCentre M51 desktop PC and some computer accessories such as display. This activity will continue until May 15, only to the United States market.

Relative person of Lenovo denied the question of price war, and said that Think marketing strategy will continue to take the high business users road. Among them, price cuts breakdown of ThinkPad is: 849 US dollars at current, 400 US dollars lower than the original price; 999 US dollars at current, 800 800 US dollars lower; 1,299 US dollars at current, 250 US dollars lower; 1,499 US dollars at current, 600 dollars lower; 1,599 US dollars at current, 200 US dollars lower, and 1,799 US dollars at current, 550 US dollars lower than the original price. 

But it still has no a real breakthrough in source of profit because profit situation is basically unsatisfactory in all regions excluding the Greater China region.

Table: Status of Lenovo’s sales revenue and business profit margin in the first and second quarter of 2005/06

    In the second quarter of 2005/06, PC shipments in Americas, Europe and the Middle East had increased, but their business profit had decreased due to declining profit margin. Sales revenue in Americas, the Middle East and Africa market had a ring growth of 63.8% and 58.7% respectively. But their business profit had declined by 13.7% and 270% respectively (Europe, Middle East and Africa market even had a loss of 68 million Hong Kong dollars, but the business revenue in last quarter is 40 million Hong Kong dollars). Therefore, Lenovo is facing with increasingly fierce competition in the two regions. Although shipment in the United States market rose by 6.1% and Dell rose by 10%, Lenovo’s development in American market is still unsatisfactory.

    The Asia-Pacific region (excluding Greater China) start to profit, but profitable contribution is not too much. Lenovo’s Sales revenue in Asia-Pacific market has a ring growth of 37.7% due to robust growth in India and other parts. More importantly, this region achieved a profit of 99 million Hong Kong dollars, while it had a loss of 29 million Hong Kong dollars in the first quarter. But this revenue only account for 12% of Lenova’s overall revenue so that this market has no much contribution to Lenovo’s overall revenue.

    In the third quarter of 2005/06, IDC calculated that PC shipment in the United States is 17 million units, with a growth of 11% year-on-year which Dell accounted for 33.2%, Lenovo accounted for 4.2% and sell 751,000 units, ranking fifth. In elsewhere of the Americas, Lenovo’s business performance is only marginally stable. Profit situation in Europe, the Middle East and Africa has improved slightly, but still facing with pressure from expansion of product portfolio. Lenovo’s sales in the Asia-Pacific region (excluding the Greater China region) have some growth.    Notebook sales accounts for 49% of Lenovo’s global PC business, and wide-screen Thinkpad Z60 and Tin Yat 100 launched in this quarter receive good praise from the market. Lenovo will implement transaction and customer-relationship model according to China's successful experience to open high growth market including SMEs and new markets. Lenovo has opened European market by Lenovo brand, and has already sell Lenovo brand computers to the SMEs in 45 countries and regions (including the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and Russia). PC business has grown by 12% in the third quarter year-on-year in global scale. Lenovo only accounts for 7.2% of the global market though it ranks third. As it is said Acer recently prepares to merge Gateway. If it is successful, Lenovo’s number three position will be between the beetle and the block.

Table: status of Lenovo’s regional business and profit

   Since financial data is accumulated historically, it is difficult for us to distinct and to calculate the impact degree from M&A according to these data. And financial data may not be able to clearly predict and describe the future earnings from M&A because it needs about three years at least for Lenovo to digest and absorb acquisition excess price and integration costs, which will impact on the comparability of financial data before and after acquisition, and will make it difficult to select benchmarks sample data as the reference. 

3.7 Unsatisfactory results during integration: experience data validation from the capital market 

After calculate Lenovo’s excess return rate and cumulative excess return rate by using regression equation  , we find that Lenovo’s overall rate of excess return is -9.035% in [3/6/2006, 4/21/2006],while IBM’s reaches 3.6627%. Therefore, in a way, we can simply think that Lenovo still did not win the major market in this period, indicating that the Lenovo’s investors still made a mistaken on telling the synergies in the period of integration. 

Table: status of Lenovo’s access revenue in the process of integration

① Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford once indicated that choice of standards performance will be confused by the phenomenon of industrial impact or concentration of M&A in the new wave of M&A in 1990s. These factors above mentioned handle and affect us to analyze accurately change trend of acquisition effect by contrasting financial data. 

We can find from the table below that the calculative excess return rate is a negative which indicate that Lenovo can not win the major market in [7/14/2005,4/17/2006]. While IBM, its counterparty achieved all the way after sold its PC business. 

Fig.: status of Lenovo’s excess return and cumulative excess return rate in the period of integration

Fig.: status of IBM’s excess return and cumulative excess return rate in the period of Lenovo’s integration

Business wisdom and strategy of both parties are reflected fully in the entire process of the M & A transactions. Now, it seems too early to tell weather Lenovo’s M&A is successful. At least, this is just the beginning. And Lenovo will be the next cursed winner? ①. Lenovo, as China's largest overseas acquisition "winners", has won the world's attention and Chinese enterprises’ anxiously expects, but it still didn’t escape from the fate of "winners curse" from the perspective of indicators such as market performance, profitability, debt risk and capital pressure and so on. 

① Not long ago, Britain "Financial Times" says ‘how is TCL?’ at the beginning of its column article, the author bring forward a problem which make a lot of people confused: What goes wrong about these Chinese pioneers of overseas M & A? Preference to merge the object with low-technology but higher brand recognition; not enough estimate of difficulty; hard to realize a real integration with overseas enterprise and to do in Rome as Rome does after acquisition; lack of long-term planning and systematic layout, which may be the key reasons cause these ‘pioneer’ fail. China TCL, who merged the French Thomson TV business, had a loss of 205 million US dollars in the first half of this year. On October 31, 2006, TCL published the latest TV programs of reorganizing European operations, in which the TTE (TCL and Thomson joint venture) will reduce most of workers in European operations, and Thomson will also provide relocation for some European staff. 

   There is still full of challenges for Lenovo which mainly come from cost control, cultural integration, technological innovation and other aspects. It is still hard to tell weather Lenovo’s acquisition is successful, but there still has no achievement from Lenovo’s global supply chain integration which be highly focused, and the recent adjustment of the strategy give the market a hit so that Lenovo is facing with great integration risk. 

In a a series of integration risks after acquisition, the seven dimensions as market, competitors, strategic choice, culture, management and costs②, investors pressures, and politics have greatest difficulties, and endanger Lenovo’s survival most prominently. Now, Lenovo is so near from the world-class enterprises goal, but it still need to face with the byproducts of international and expansion, such as thorny problems as rising cost and declining profit 

Lenovo’s business model of insisting on costs operating meets another limit after ‘it met ‘return to nuclear’ in world-class long-distance race’. If want to escape from the cursed fate and is proved to be the winner in triumph, Lenovo will undoubtedly face with more challenges all the way.

4. Policy recommendations and conclusions

China is one of largest economic entity in the world. If counted by purchasing power, it has been 2/3 of the united state economy, and it’s very possible to exceed Germany and the United Kingdom in the next five years, and may surpass Japan in 2020 (Roland.Bagby, 2005). China plays an important role in the world economic stage, and enterprises should undertake this historical important task yet. Approaching merger has become an important means of corporation expansion. TCL and Benq’s M&A ended basically in failure which will result in “an autumn leaves keep abreast of the world” fear to more Chinese enterprises who try to expand production capacity and speed up access to international market. The M&A is indeed a double-edged sword and need us to analyze rationally.

① In 1997, Boeing got into a complex integration and financial crisis after merge McDonnell. While rival Airbus took the opportunity to grab market share and by the end of 1999, it gulp down 48% of global contract for delivery and become the biggest civilian aircraft manufacturers replace McDonnell in 2003. In 2002,HP merge Compaq, HP and Compaq enough, not only did not achieve the expected growth performance, the market share is actually shrinking.  Before M&A, Compaq’s PC market is better than Dell, while after the acquisition, new HP direct give its PC business Champion cup to Dell.

In 1997, Taiwan's Acer Group merged PC subsidiaries of Texas Instruments Inc., TXN. But this company turns its focus on European market because it is unable to build a large distribution network in United States. 

In order to pave the way to United States market, South Korea's Samsung Electronics (Samsung Electronics Co.) bought AST Research Inc., the world's fifth-largest PC maker at that time at a cost of 377 million US dollars. And then Samsung Electronics invested hundreds of millions dollars to operating this subsidiary which is losing. Finally, the subsidiary company was sold at price of 200 million US dollars. 

Earlier, Nippon Electric Company (NEC Corp.) merged Packard Bell Electronics Inc. with a brilliant performance in retail market at that time in 1996. But it eventually retired from the retail market soon. 

② The table below shows that the proportion between total manual cost and operating income has gradually rise, from which the negative impact should not be overlooked.

4.1 The logic overseas acquisitions enterprises to follow①: Know your partners and know yourself

Chinese enterprises will play an increasingly important role in global mergers and acquisitions②. However, during the overseas acquisition process, Chinese enterprises need to consider and analyze their own industry in the place at first, and need to be in the global arena Center since others will change for a competitive posture position, whether it is actively involved in mergers and acquisitions, or to take defensive measures.

Global multinational companies have quite a long history and have accumulated rich experience about overseas acquisitions. To Chinese enterprises who try to overseas acquisitions, If they can learn useful investment structure design skills from the history of M&A rule changes, it will certainly reduce the amount of transaction costs.

Before make a desicision for major purchases, the business decision-makers must have a clear understanding of their strategic objectives, risks bottom line, and the overseas market, and must follow the principle of gradual and orderly progress. Meanwhile, the following three propositions should be depth consider: 1) a clear strategic framework. Including Clearly combine M&A motivation and realize motivation and also a detailed assessment of the associated risks; 2) the bottom line of price and the maximum value in the premium acquisition; 3) The development trends of future trade or industry and it’s affect factor to integration.

Furthermore, in order to better implement the strategy for acquisition, it is necessary to address the economic, social and cultural background, pre-complete public relations and publicity programs, well outside the government lobbying and public relations, so as to reduce cultural resistance, the public opinion resistance and political resistance as possible.

4.1.1 Leading Innovation: Find the path of profitability

In the increasingly fierce market competition, the limitations of increasing the size of the acquisition are very obvious. If simple acquisition can not maintain order, then innovation must take up increasing responsibility for continuance profitability④. Enterprises who want to win in the global arena should optimize product design, enhance product development capability and unite product innovation and higher quality services organicly. ① Despite the economic strength of the fourth highest in the world, China is not really strong for lacking of core technologies. As the main innovation of enterprises in the global location will determine China's future destiny ②, Chinese enterprises overseas acquisitions influx of China's industrial development is a microcosm of the increased China's international reputation. We need to reexamine the issue of overseas mergers and acquisitions. Realizing international through the implementation of M&A business is not the ultimate objectives. If the enterprise only takes international as the ultimate goal at all costs, the culture of self-confidence established from small to large will be destryed. Meanwhile, it will accelerate the decline. Steeped in Hong Kong capital market for several years, Lenovo's management structure has met or exceeded the regulatory requirements of Hong Kong. It is difficult to say if the core technologies can be obtained by acquiring. However, there is no doubt concluded that if the new Lenovo unable to establish the capability of independent innovation system, it will difficult to stand in the international market.

It is necessary to Lenovo to strategic transform from low-cost strategies to more value-added brands strategies. This process is very difficult and need to invest more research and development and need maintaining sale patience. The profitable growth strategy of Lenovo is undoubtedly good. But in order to find profitable market space in subdivision market, Lenovo must also have Differentiated products, or, it is difficult to achieve an international brand. The case of Japan Honda in its international process can give us more inspiration. 40 years ago, Honda has no sales channels in the United States. In motorcycle market, the main product is 500CC large displacement vehicles produced by Hariri, David. However, Honda gradually won consumer loyalty by developing 100CC, the 200CC easy launch of a small displacement motorcycles.

①TCL play the same important role in overseas acquisitions. LiDongSheng, the president of TCL, uphold a core logic "big not always strong, but not big scarcely strong”. The logic ideas become the important starting point for Great Leap Forward-overseas acquisition. Because the prices of domestic market is decline and the profits is more and more thin, geographic expansion become the key problem involved the issue of enterprise’s survival. It is not reliable business logic if not pragmatic, lack of fully understand of mergers market, simply taking establishing a strong business empire as a drive for overseas acquisition and not to careful assessment the rate of return. During 1980-2001, there have 15 largest Japan companies who make overseas acquisition transactions, only four cases succeed.

Therefore, prior to the merger, enterprises must understand the market and must accumulate sufficient free cash flow so as to take any restructuring costs. 

We should learn experience from Indian enterprises in overseas mergers and acquisitions. Under normal circumstances, Indian companies take domestic as a starting point, expand overseas only when they have a distinct competitive advantage, and not simply adopt the low-cost strategy.

②Jason Maxwell, analyst of US TCW Group, considered that the importance of China on the world stage is increase gradually.

③The research report IBM Commercial Value Research Institute released in 2006 point out that, the overseas investment of China is still mainly aimed at small and medium-sized projects, the average investment amount is 1 million US dollars which is much lower than the developed countries (i.e. 6 million US dollars). Regional distribution is imbalances and Hong Kong is still the main invest position. Furthermore, the overall performance of internationalization is still not satisfactory, only 55% profit.

The survey result of main internationalization motivation of Chinese enterprises show that, the importance of looking for new business opportunities for growth is 4.5 (up to 5); the  importance of learning advanced technology and management ideas is 3.8; the importance of avoid the intense internal competition in the market is 3.1; the importance of scattered business and the risks of the market is 2.8; the importance of access to productive resources and improve production efficiency and respond to the macroeconomic environment is 2.3; and, the importance of access to overseas funds is 1.5.

④TCL once attempt to use "high-end brand grafting" strategy through Thomson. BenQ try to integrate the weak Siemens cellpones by low costs myth. At present, these two ideas have ended in failure. 

The simple explanation is, the product lines acquired by TCL have significant structural defects; And BenQ can not improve its driver located terms and sales channels.

Ross Levine and Sergio Schmukler select 9096 enterpirses from 74 countries and from year of 1989 to 2000.

 

4.1.2 In fair weather prepare for foul: Eliminate Impatience④


Chinese enterprises should also follow a common game paradigm In overseas acquisition process⑤. This include (1) the importance of respecting intellectual property, labor and environmental standards and other important factors; (2)Efforts to create a win-win transaction structure; (3)Mantaininig sensitive to cultural differences; (4)A clear definition and communication with the goals and objectives of organizations retain the key; (5) Promoting the integration process actively and prudently.

If sustained profitability unable to meet investor expectations, investors will vote with their feet and depress stock prices. What needed for Lenovo is to arrange anti-takeover measures early, inculding offen used method “Position Pill” and “Gold Parachute Plan”. And Lenovo can also using the rule of “The merger or transfer control of the company (include internationalization and uninternationalization company) as the need for measuring changes in the Tobin Q samples”.

The result shows that, the Q-value is 1.96 before one year after international (listed or acquire) a year and one year after that rapidly fall to 1.53.

①Using TCL's acquisition for reference, we have found that the internationalized companies is certainly not the lowest-cost company and only innovation is the life of globalization enterprises. Companies who overseas acquisitions must learn to invest in future.

② In March 2006, Chinese government proposed independent innovation strategy for strengthening independent innovation in the 10th session of the Fourth National People's Congress report aimed at changing China's industrial structure and growth mode and highlighted China.

In October 2006, IBM Commercial Value Research Institute has a research basedon the surveying to 100 Chinese CEO. The result show that, Chinese enterprises are more inclined to using  following strategy.There are 43% of Chinese enterprises tend to improve the existing products and services, only 4% willing to launch new products and services while international enterprises reached 18%. The following table shows the R & D expenditures of IBM, Dell and other PC makers.

③In a sense, internationalization like a mirror and a yardstick. It enlarged the gap between China's top companies and global players. TCL president Li Dongsheng thinks that, for some things, you make an accurate judgment prior to it is very difficult and one must go inside to do it before the discovery. Also see: Shen Yin. "TCL protracted war", "Chinese entrepreneurs", Issue 8, 2006, P52.

④Toyota had spend 45 years to do international marketing before got the ninth global brand which published by international brand consultancy company Interband. On the end of August 2006, on EMBA opening ceremony of Zhongshan University, John Quelch, the vice president of Harvard Business School, warned that Chinese enterprises should not have no impatience on the road to globalization plan.

⑤From the macro perspective, the acquisition is the pressure release and power sources of economic development. In the global market with technical innovation and demands changing constantly, the original allocation of resources program which following the beaten track can not meet the objective requirements for upgrading the industrial structure and changing the mode of production qualitatively. Under the pressure of breakthrough in shackles, acquisition, as a profitable opportunity for an instinctive reaction, change the social resources the distribution and redistribution potentially.

⑥Position Pill skill mean that the company issue a new low-priced stocks to their own shareholders once the control right transferred, or request the immediate payment of the bonds originally enterprises. The Gold Parachute Plan mean that, according to the term listed in the provisions of corporate charter, the buyer should pay substantial compensation to the original senior managers when the management reorganization.

4 / 5 vote or made" prior to shareholder approval of a special resolution, excluding the executives and directors, the company may not make important management transfer agreement outside the company ". To further increase the acquisition costs. Moreover, Lenovo need to have a clear summary, analysis and balance the direction and the pace of internationalization, accumulate the experience and lessons of internationalization, and thoroughly abandon the shortcoming of "impatience" which may led to the operating difficulties during enterprise growth and expansion process.


4.2 The logic role the government plays in overseas acquisitions


4.2.1 Government property rights protection behavior: the ancient but real matter

Overseas acquisition and protection of property rights are interdependent and cooperation. In the 19th century to the early 20th century, British protect overseas property rely on three mechanisms, namely the strength of the Navy, the iron of the States of London's financial markets and industrial dependence on technological superiority. China seem have none of the deterrent power of the above three types of any kind (Chen Zhiwu, 2005). 

Open up international markets through mergers and acquisitions have to accept the local legal framework. If there is no sound legal area, or acquisition target in countries① of poor protection of property rights Argentina, Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, Indonesia, then the problem accordingly come along. In clouds rushing of overseas mergers and acquisitions, if there have potential safety problems  about the large number of overseas funds, what should we rely on to strength the protection of property rights of Chinese overseas acquisitions? ② Consider from the visual angle of protecting property rights, in order to reduce the risk of overseas acquisition, the government has the responsibility to establish its own deterrent force, to improve China's soft power and improve the the degree of  their dependence to China.


4.2.2 Government support and supervision behavior ③: the choices and implementation of policy with dual objectives

Foreign investments into Chinese market further aggravate the domestic market competition. Our perfecting-supervision road is still long and arduous under the dual objectives of using foreign capital and protecting national interests. In order to provide enterprises with good development platform, positive and reasonable measures can be actively taken to support and protect the healthy development of Chinese-funded enterprises. The improvement of the level of supervision can also create a good circumstance.

①On the history of these countries, there have precedent of depriving the property of foreign companies. The internal political is instabe and the lack of stringent legal environment. The Local government influence foreign companiesthrough legislative, for example, Using revenue tools to adjust the distribution of benefits; Using exchange controls to prevent capital gains exit; Using public sentiment to hinder the operation of a business; Using non-market measures to investigate Chinese enterprises. In November 2007, under the the pressure of  easing production, Chery Automobile, who just firm foothold in domestic, negotiate with Argentina's Socma group to form a joint venture company  to produce sport type and compact type cars. Moreover, Chery has actively sought in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia and other countries for investment.

②At autumn of 2005, the United States State Department decided to purchase 16,000 Lenovo computers with a total value of 13 million US dollars. On May 4, 2006, the Representatives Chairman of Appropriations Committee of United States House, Frank Wolf, wrote a letter to Richard Griffin, the Assistant Secretary of State Department Diplomatic Security Service, claimed that "Lenovo is a Chinese government-controlled companies, the U.S. State Department should investigate this transaction." The State Department immediately denote on May 19th that the computers ordered from Lenovo will only be used for unclassified work, and the United States government will change the corresponding government procurement process.

The second decision will have great destruction to Lenovo. If the process was changed, the huge orders inherited from IBM will go down the drain. This will directly suppress the Legend's overseas expansion. Although the United States amend process with the pretext of security is in accordance with domestic law and international procurement agreement (GPA), it is obviously contrary to the essence of the spirit of free trade. Therefore, the protection of interests and property rights for Chinese overseas acquisitions has become increasingly urgency. Since then, the Australian government has directly ruled out Lenovo from the manufacturers list of government order. 

According to the report of "Chinese enterprises in India repeated unjust treatment" in "Reference News," edition 11,June 1, 2006,  in the past five years, Sino-Indian trade volume from 3.5 billion US dollars rapidly increased to 18 billion US dollars, however, the investment activities of Chinese enterprises is still limited. Following Huawei and Hutchison Whampoa, recently, cimc-tianda Bidding India 42 airbridges (about 17.55 million US dollars) on low price competition was unexpectedly rejected, the reason was also that it may "hazard" the"national security" of India.

③During the two sessions in 2006, Li Dongsheng proposaled that : improving foreign exchange management system; Strengthening the inside and outside financing support for the experimental enterprises; Implementing full refund policy for experimental enterprises which can stimulate large-scale exports right after mergers and acquisitions; 

Improving bonded policies and personnel entry and exit policy so that the cargo (unit, accessories, etc.) and staff of experimental enterprises access more convenient and efficient. Specific See report: "going out needs policy support.", "Chinese entrepreneurs", No.8, 2006.

The market environment will help to promote the further development and expansion of domestic-funded enterprises ①so as to reserve strength for overseas acquisitions.

Overseas acquisitions will all face the pressure of low and administrative investigation of the target location. They are also confronted with some non-market factors barriers obstacles ②. On view of protection the development of domestic-funded enterprises, the state should actively improve review mechanism of anti-monopoly and merger ③ and national economic security. For overseas acquisition, the government could actively offer strategic guidance for the acquisition enterprises and promote the govern coordination for M&A by establishing a overseas M&A Coordination Group.

4.2.3 Government promoting behavior for innovation and regulation: expedite financing channels

The separate operations and management of financial-industry result in the state of fragmentation of the financial sector led, and the combination of investment channels and portfolio capital is blocked.

The financial gap of high-risk and acquisition enterprise was very prominent. Aim at the needs of M&A enterprises, a variety of fund-raising channels can be established to spread the risks. The special loan portfolio launched by commercial banks for M&A enterprises should be encouraged and promoted④. Balancing the innovation and regulatory of the bond market⑤, and building a really effective bond market to meet acquisition demand; Relaxing the investment restrictions for domestic special financing business and supporting and regulating them for providing financial management activities to M&A; Promoting entrust new business support and merger reorganization business; Promoting and encouraging the continued rising foreign reserves for overseas investment ⑥.


4.3 conclusions  


There have nearly 500 years history of acquisitions in western developed countries while in China has just start and there are few vivid merger cases to learn for Chinese enterprises.

Lenovo's acquisition not only take a substantial step to internationalization, but also provide Chinese enterprises a a reference coordinates origin for acquisition and development. The integration of Lenovo is still facing a considerable challenge. Although we can not foresee the accurate answer of the destination of integration road of Lenovo, Lenovo's senior management has far exceeded the responsibility of Chinese entrepreneurs the time given to, if we on view of the long river of history to look at this merger. This is because, no matter view from any angle, Lenovo, as overseas acquisition forerunner, is of milestone significance. Every exploration step for grow will destined to be the model for Chinese enterprises to learn and reference.

① we need to learn the experience from South Korea and Japan on supporting domestic enterprises, and take the initiative to nurture globalization Chinese enterprises with good innovative capacity. As all knows, 

the Japanese and South Korean governments has played an active coordinating role in the process of globalization, they provide enterprises with the corresponding industrial policy support and nurtured some world-renowned globalization corporations such as Samsung, Sony, Toyota and etc..

②From the case of Lenovo whose acquisition process was rigorous review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and the case of CNOOC merger Unocal and Haier merger Maytag who all be actively intervened by the United States, we can found that, the United States, who has been promoting the economic globalization and free trade, issued "antitrust law" and set up a foreign investment committee to evaluate and review of the transnational mergers and acquisitions of important industry as early as 30s of the 19th century.

And other western countries also limit the key industries mergers and acquisitions through formulating and improving the legal framework and the use of trict review of the measures and means.

In particular, CNOOC, Unocal merger was investigated by so-called national security interests. The ideology forces of United States finally defeat the strength of market.

③On antitrust review, the U.S. antitrust review mechanisms are very mature and perfect both from the legislative system and the spirit, or the actual program design and operation. Our antitrust review mechanism is still in its initial stage of construction and exploration. Although anti-monopoly issue was involved in different aspects and field by the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law” which promulgated in 1993 and the "price law" which enacted in 1997 and some other administrative regulations, so far, no systemtic and integrated anti-monopoly law was introduced.

The draft of "anti-monopoly law" will meet the first consideration in the Twenty-two meeting of 10th NPC Standing Committee in June 2006 according the 2006 legislation plan determined by the NPC Standing Committee in early 2006. The anti-monopoly law of China was finally to the final sprint stage after 12 years around.

④Zhu Cong jiu (2006), the general manager of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, consider that the commercial banks have started to be involved in the selective capital markets business. M&A could be considered as a specialized business to regulate, restrain and develop on next step.

⑤ Current domestic listed companies can only issue products of convertible bonds type, while issuing credit bonds is the inevitable trend.

⑥ The data released by central People's Bank on October 13 show that, until the end of September 2006, the foreign exchange reserves of China amounted to 987.928 billion US dollars, grow 28.46% year-on-year, and the amount of reserves is still the number one in the world.

The experience accumulated in every aspect of internationalization process will help to promote the overseas acquisition of local enterprises.

In short, by analyzes the economic consequences of Lenovo's acquisition, we hope Chinese media giving an objective and dispassionate comments after the stir pursued. This is also a return of rational spirit, and it is a necessary step for Chinese enterprises making for mature on overseas acquisitions.

财务年度权益净利润率及销售净利润率的变动趋势图 

从毛利率及主营业务利润率环比的变动趋势来看,并购后的各季度环比大都是负增长(见下图),尽管并购后第一季度毛利率相较去年同期增长了2%,但同比一季度降低了300多万港元,主要因为经营费用环比上升39.2%至32亿港币;以及无形资产摊销及补偿环比增长了50%至2.63亿港元; 并购后第四季度主营业务利率润较前一季度降副高达1.439倍,2005/06第四季度成本费用利润率为居然高达-3.6%,并购后的盈利能力可见一斑。因此,联想并购前认为能够产生成本费用的节约将无法按期兑现

对于联想而言,最为关键的问题是如何实施盈利性增长的策略?如何在短期内实现并购的协同效应,以实现事前董事会在通函中描述的乐观前景。而对于更好地整合并购的PC业务,到目前为止,联想的业绩仍然无法取悦股东和投资者②。 

图 联想财务指标季度环比变动情况图 

下面,我们进一步分析销售净利润变化的影响因素,其中主要包括销售费用、管理费用和财务费用,这些影响因素都出现了不同程度的大幅增长(见下图)。 

表 联想并购前后成本费用汇总情况表 

尽管并购后联想规模位居全球第三,但与戴尔、惠普的市场地位仍不可同日而语。戴尔2005财年第四季度净利润①高达10.1亿美元,EPS为 43美分;而联想2005/06财年第三季度净利润则只有3.74亿港元,尽管相比第二季度增长了12%,而会计准则对商誉②处理的变化也有效缓解了联想短期的盈利压力。在海外市场高额的运营费用和推广成本情况下,既要进一步提高服务水平,又要提高盈利能力,对目前只有1.8%净利的联想而言,任重而道远。与此同时,低成本、低价格战略的戴尔也面临着利润率却下滑的趋势无疑也给联想传递了一个负面信号③。 

① 下表中为HP和DELL季度数据,可以看出联想的净利率远远低于竞争对手。 

② 采纳香港财务报告准则第3号规定、香港会计准则第36号及香港会计准则第38号导致商誉之会计政策出现变动。截止2005年3月31日止,商誉乃:按照直线法基于3到10年不等之年摊销;及于每个结算日评估减值迹象。根据香港财务报告准则第3号:联想于2005年4月1日起停止摊销商誉。从2006年3月31日止年度起,商誉须于每年及每当出现减值迹象时进行减值测算。 

联想并购交易的总金额大约为17.5亿美元,并购由于协同效应产生了9,895,278,000港币的商誉,尽 管按照香港新会计准则规定,商誉不按照使用年限进行直线摊销。 

③ 中国有句古语“取其上,得乎其中;取其中,得乎其下”。对于希望借鉴戴尔运营模式联想而言,低成本运营模式的盈利压力也是不言而喻的。2003-2005年,戴尔研究投入占营业收入比重分别为1.12%,0.94%,0.83%。2006年7月21日,戴尔公司表示第二季度的收益低于预期,至此,戴尔股价下跌10%,每股为19.91美元,实际营业额为140亿,低于预期2亿美元。此外,戴尔开始改变单纯依靠电话和直销方式,2006年在达拉斯和纽约开了两家零售店。 

3.1.2 偿债能力持续降低:来自Z模型的进一步分析 

从2005/06第一到第四季度现金产生能力的角度看,盈利性压力无疑会进一步放大联想的财务风险与隐患。从稳健性角度来看,联想并购后05/06第三季度的利息保障倍数较04/05第一季度降低了98.7%,05/06第三季度的速动比率较04/05第四季度降幅也达到了44.37%。我们发现,这起“蛇吞象”的并购产生的最主要经济后果,是直接加剧弱化了联想的偿债能力,并且急剧地放大了联想的财务风险。 

基于此,下文将直接利用Z模型①检验联想面临的破产风险。根据Z模型计算的结果,我们发现了从2004/05第一季度开始到第四季度,联想Z值呈现逐季直线的下降趋势(见下表),降幅竟然高达93.8%,这一结果与前面稳健能力中的偿债能力指标恶化的趋势如出一辙。 

表:联想2004/05财年到2005/06财年季度Z值计算结果 

我们知道,联想2005/06第二、三、四季度的Z值都小于1.21(见下图),而根据Altman的判断结论,我们可以得出联想已经陷入了破产困境。尽管这一结论有些危言耸听,但据Altman的研究结果,我们至少可以有充足的理由认为联想并购的经济后果之一就是直接放大了联想的财务风险。 

Z值模型是由纽约大学著名财务学教授Edward I.Altman于1968年研究提出的,在此基础上,Altman又于2000年进行了修正。经过修正后的模型为:Z=0.717X1+0.847X2+3.107X3+0.420X4+0.998X5,其中X1=营运资本/总资产;X2=留存收益/总资产;X3=息税前利润/总资产;X4=股东权益账面价值/负债总额账面价值;X5=营业收入/总资产。采用这一指标,Altman研究了实际情况分别为破产和未破产的两组公司,两组的公司数量分别为33家,研究发现:1)破产组Z值平均数为0.15,未破产的Z值平均数为4.14。2)Z<1.21的为破产的公司,Z>2.90的公司为未破产公司;而Z∈[1.23,2.90]的公司有部分公司为破产公司,部分是未破产公司。3)用Z值预测破产公司的准确率为91%,预测未破产公司的准确率为97%。 

事实上,香港资本市场有效性能与美国资本市场的有效性相媲美,因此本文可以直接利用在美国市场的经验数据基础上建立的Z模型

图 2004/05—2005/06财务年度Z值组成指标及Z值变动趋势 

下面,我们从联想贷款情况在做一比较和分析。2005年3月31日,股东权益为52.04亿元,长期及流动负债为38.04亿元;而截止9月30日,联想尚未偿还的定期贷款①为39亿港币,与总权益92.8亿港币比,贷款权益比为0.42;尽管联想期内并无融资租赁的资产;12月31日股东权益为93.86亿港元,长期及流动负债为港币366.05亿元,流动比率为1.01,截止12月31日②,尚未偿还银行定期贷款为37.91亿港元及短期银行借款港币为0.62亿元,贷款与权益比为0.41。 

2006年3月31日,股东权益1.42亿港币,长期及流动负债为311.68亿港币,尚未偿还银行贷款为定期贷款7.8亿港币及短期银行贷款10.01亿港币③,与总权益81.48亿港币相比,贷款权益比率为0.22。 

表 联想流动比率及贷款权益比情况比较表 

① 2005年4月26日,联想与银团签定了一项总额为6亿美元的定期贷款及循环贷款融资,贷款利息为LIBOR加0.825%,并须于5年内分期付款偿还。 

② 2005/06财年前三季度,联想除了收购业务支付了6.5亿美元现金之外,而其余5.4亿港元的资本性支出主要包括购置固定资产、在建工程及优化办公信息系统。 

③ 尽管联想于2006年3月13日获得一笔银团4亿美元(约为31.2亿港币)的循环及有期贷款,每年按照LIBOR加0.52厘计息,同月也获得国内政策银行1亿美元的贷款(约7.8亿港币)的5年期定息贷款,该笔贷款的目的是取代于2005年4月收购IBM PC业务所需资金获取的收购贷款。 

注:股息*表示不须于五年内偿还优先股股息及相关财务费用 

表 联想贷款及优先股股息情况汇总表 

注:*表示为不须于五年内全部偿还的可转换优先股股息及相关财务费用 

财务费用占税后溢利之比,从02/03年的0.06%到05/06第四季度的21.59%,就目前的盈利能力而言,联想的偿债压力和能力可见一斑。 

联想财务费用占税后溢利比重变动情况表 

3.1.3 资金捉襟见肘:来自现金流量的进一步分析 

“现金为王”的经营理念已经成为共识。下面,我们从资金的角度来分析联想面临的资金困境。2005年12月31日,联想现金及等价物为134.1亿港币,但05/06第四季度(3/31/2006)资金及等价物余额则为78.38亿,较季初的134.1亿,下降幅度高达41.5%。从这个角度来看,可动用的资金余额降幅较大,对联想而言,资金问题捉襟见肘。 

① 联想按照每股1000元发行2730000股可转换优先股及可认购237417474股的非上市认股权证,总现金代价为27.3亿港币。可转换优先股附有固定累计优先现金利息,每季度以每股可转换优先股发行价的年股息率4.5%派发。可转换股于2012年5月17日到期全部赎回,价格相当于发行价加股东选择的优先股累计未付的利息。可转换优先股于2006年3月31日负债及股本部分公允价值为0.84亿和 24.33亿。认股权证将于2010年5月17日届满。 

图 2004/05—2005/06财务年度现金及等价物绝对数变化趋势 

而从下面的图中,我们能够发现,联想05/06第四季度的现金及等价物出现-56.41亿元,并购后经营活动首次出现了-25.91亿元的入不敷出,融资活动净现金居然为-26.52亿元,投资支出为3.97亿元,因此,我们无法回避联想面临的资金压力困境。 

图 2004/05—2005/06财务年度各活动资金变化趋势 

下面,从资金币种结构安排来看,2005年3月31日现金及等价物余额30.19亿元中,港元占0.8%,美元42%。人民币为57.2%;12月31日余额131.1亿元中美元40.2%。人民币为37.8%,欧元6.4%,日元3%,港元占12.6%;2006年3月31日,在78.4亿的余额中,美元占36.7%,欧元7.3%,日元5.5%,港币等17.5%。在连续对现金产生负面影响之外,这种结构安排在第四季度对联想的净现金流产生了正6924.7港币的影响。但是,汇率的变动风险是双刃剑,这种结构安排的收益与风险平衡能力,对联想资金和盈利而言,仍然存在较大的风险。 

从联想可动用信用额度的角度来看,2005年3月31日联想可动用信用额度为港币32.75亿元,其中港币14.73亿元为贸易信用及信用证贷款额度,港币7.4亿元为短期及循环现金透支,而港币10.62亿元则为外汇合约及期权,到2005年3月31日,已经动用了贸易信用及信用证贷款额度为港币3.42亿元,动用外汇合约及期权为港币0.94亿。2005年12月31日可动用信贷额度为港币120.92港元,其中港币21.88港元为贸易信用及信用证贷款额度,港币11.8亿为短期及循环现金透支,港币87.24亿元为远期外汇合约及衍生工具。但已经动用贸易及信用证贷款额度为4.02亿港币,远期外汇合约及衍生工具为港币45.87亿元。 

图 联想可动用信用额度变化情况 

通过上述的分析,我们发现,联想面临着资产收益率持续下降以及资金压力日趋严重的困境。如果盈利继续没有起色的话,那么,资金安全性的风险和隐患将会暴露无遗。如果联想能充分认识和估计资金环节面临的风险因素,未雨绸缪,都会有助于及早破解这一 

困局①。但无论如何,能否从容应对盈利与资金的压力,将是维系联想成功度过生死攸关的整合期的关键所在。 

3.1.3 整合前景堪忧②:来自运营效率的进一步分析 

最后,从运营能力的角度看,联想并购后四个季度也都出现了不同程度的降低,并购后,存货周转率从11.59降到了第四季度的6.71,尽管存货周转速度降低与公司销售策略有关,但更多还是由于联想的全球内、外部供应链整合进程缓慢有关,供应链的响应速度直接影响着联想低成本的销售策略实现的前景。面对激烈的竞争,高效的物流环节无疑是取胜的法宝③。 

联想并购后,2005/06财年的第四季度的主营业务利润率较2004/05财年第一季度降幅达66.95%。主营业务利润率出现了大幅下降(见下图)。由于联想研发投入05/06财年仅占营收的1.68%,而PC产品技术的核心部件很多采用外购的方式,主板主要外购英特尔/AMD的产品,操作系统主要采购微软Windows。当完全依赖外部公司提供组件和系统设计的时候,那么盈利模式就必须依赖于公司内部改革来提高运营效率。目前,联想主营业务利润率降低主要的原因是与存货周转率和应收帐款周转率的降低有着直接的关系,从这一角度看,联想还更应该注重通过效率的提高来实现成本降低的预期。 

图 联想并购前后各季度主营业务利润率变动趋势 

总之,从上述四个维度指标的变动趋势看,联想仍然没有显现出真正的并购协同效应,尽管联想高管能有足够的耐心等待转机,但资本市场对盈利期望的耐心非常有限。我们也发现,联想并购的经济后果与冯根福和吴江林(2001)国内并购研究结论(并购第一年内的业绩较好)背道而驰

① 根据CFO国际联合会(IAFEI)对321家纽约上市企业的调查,每家需遵守SOX法案的大型企业,第一年实施404条款的平均总成本超过了460万美元;年营收50亿美元的公司一般需要花费800万美元;GE遵循的成本高达3000万美元。联想CFO马雪征曾在此前的采访中,否认了联想赴纽约上市的传闻。 

② 2006年9月11日,联想已经被香港方面从蓝筹股中划出。 

③ 2001-2003年期间,低成本的领先者戴尔的库存周转率率先降到了4、3、3天,而联想为25、23、25天

3.2 市场拓展差强人意:来自财务与非财务的经验数据 

并购后①的联想市场的业绩并没有出现悲观者所预期的大幅下滑状况,也没有遭遇“滑铁卢”,即1+1≤2。这主要可以归纳为以下两个原因。一方面,由于IBM PC与联想的客户并没有太多的重叠,没有出现收入耗损(Revenue Attrition)的现象,同时,也得益于PC行业出现了近年来最好的出货记录和市场增长率;另一方面,则是由于并购的影响存在滞后效应。众所周知,大客户的定单往往存在较长的时滞效应,大客户更换供应商的时间较长,因此,大客户业务暂时没有受到太大的影响;在零售渠道,由于信息不对称,联想继续使用IBM的品牌不会立即改变IBM忠实消费者的购买倾向。 

我们发现(见下表),联想在[1998,2001]财年期间,营收环比增长幅度相对稳定,但[2001,2005]财年期间营收的环比增长速度明显变缓。 

表 联想1998—2005财年营业额环比增长情况汇总 

尽管如此,相对并购前四个季度营收的环比增长幅度 [-3.8%,11.57%,-25.29%],并购后四个季度的增幅为[45.28%,9.02%,-21.53%]。当然,并购后环比增幅离散程度更大,表明联想目前蕴涵着较大的市场拓展风险。 

在整合IBM技术、品牌后,联想可以充分利用IBM渠道、销售、客户金融创新和服务影响力来开拓国际市场②。尽管联想05/06财年第二季度销售收入达310.65亿港元,相比一季度,虽然增幅达7.4%,但与全球PC出货量15%的实际上增幅相比,联想实际仍然没有跑赢大市③。 

下面,结合全球竞争者来分析联想的市场地位,从市场份额的角度看,我们能够看出,联想全球市场份额与竞争对手戴尔和惠普的差距是非常明显的;从增长速度看,宏基④市场份额的增长速度明显超越联想,因而,联想并购之后的市场地位也变得极为尴尬。在前有围堵,后卫追兵的困境之下,市场份额突破目前的极限将是决定联想实现品牌国际化的首要任务

① TCL总裁李东升主导的两起海外并购,并购整合没有出现预期的结果,更没有出现所谓的协同效应。到目前仍然没有见到盈利的曙光,产业升级打乱了彩电业务的整合节奏。出现严重亏损2006年10月31日TCL集团与法国Thomson同时发布公告将对两者的合资公司进行重组,次日,TCL股价上涨9%。国内市场手机业务全面萎缩,与阿尔卡特建立的手机合资业务在2005年解散。TCL整合效果没有出现预期的结果,更没有出现所谓的协同效应。 

② 联想并购之初,《华尔街日报》评论认为并购将使IBM成为联想的忠实客户,同时,联想可以进一步寻求新的投资领域和未来的发展空间,并且还能分散联想经营上的地域风险。 

③ 由于在新由市场,台式电脑和笔记本电脑逐渐得到推广;在较为成熟的市场上,二次购买需求及转向购买笔记本电脑的消费者数量增长较快,这些因素共同驱动了全球PC市场的增长。2006年3月份IDC公布数据显示,联想PC出货量占全球PC市场的份额从原来的17.1%下降到了12.6%。 

④ 2006年11月,媒体报道宏基可能采取联想并购扩大规模的方式来实现市场份额的增长和品牌的国际化。 


图 全球PC四大生产商的出货量情况 


注:上图为作者根据Gartner Dataquest公布数据整理而成 

图 全球PC四大生产商市场占有率情况 

3.2.1 地域盈利苦乐不均:来自地域销售的经验数据 

我们有必要先简单了解全球PC行业市场份额的分布和增长情况。从下表中,我们能够看出,EMEA、美国和亚太地区占了全球市场的82.3%份额,前两者也占了全球市场的62%,亚太、拉丁美洲及EMEA地区的增长率增高达两位数,因此,从总量和增长速度上看,国际化的联想必须能在这些地区成为有竞争力的PC厂商,否则难遂联想国际化的初衷。 

表 全球市场出货量及市场份额情况比较 

根据全球市场份额的分布和增长情况,下面,我们有必要进一步分析联想在不同地域的市场表现情况,实际上,在全球市场份额举足轻重的EMEA、美国地区,联想不但无法取得足够的市场占有率,同时,也无法提供足够的盈利贡献。204/05第二季度,IDC统计数据显示,美国该季度PC销量增长11.7%,联想在美国市场份额为4.1%①,低于去年的5.1%,PC销量为61.1万台,同比下滑了8.4%,但年增长率下降了8%。而联想增长最终还是主要依靠大中华地区的强劲表现。 

下面,我们在进一步看看联想收入结构中不同地域的表现情况。我们能够发现,联想05/06财年的营销结构中,大中华地区基本维持在35%以上,1-2季度贡献盈利占到了67%以上;美国市场收入占联想的30%左右,3-4季度亏损状况与其收入比例明显不符;增长较快的EMEA地区收入占比提高了2.19%,但亏损数额也增加了157.4%,如果试图采取低价策略进入市场的话,对羽翼未丰的联想而言,低价的效果与盈利的压力将是足够大的考验

表 联想各地域市场营业额及贡献比较 

注:营业贡献*为不包括重组费用营业贡献 

从下图中,我们也能非常直观地看出,并购后的联想绝大部分仍然倚重大中华地区,这与之前的局面基本没有大的改观。如果这种状况继续维持下去,那么,除了营收总额由于简单加和带来的增长之外,为股东创造财富和价值增长的并购协同效应又在那里呢? 

表 04/05-05/06财务年度地域营业额及贡献情况比较 

下面,我们再从联想的分类业务来看,电脑、手持设备等两大业务来看其分类营收的

 

① 戴尔在美国市场的PC占有率为34.7%惠普为18.7%,GATEWAY 6%,位居第三,联想较一季度下降了0.1%,以4.1%位于第五位贡献情况①。PC业务仍是联想营收的最主要来源,并购后PC营收的比重由80%到93%以上的比例,手持设备的比重并购后稀释到了营收的4%左右。因此,从这点看,我们认为联想仍然继续遵循归核PC化的战略②。 

图:联想分类业务营收绝对数值情况比较 

下面,我们再从分类业务资源占用和资本支出的角度看,并购后的PC资源占用仍占87%以上的比例,资本支出占93%以上,但盈利能力很大部分来源于手持设备业务,而手持设备的资源占用仅占8%以上,资本支出仅占3~4%左右。从这个角度看,并购后的PC业务并没有带来足够的盈利贡献。 

表 联想分类业务的营业额和占用资产情况 

并购前联想已经做好了重兵囤积大中华地区的准备,其中,建立了18个分区,110个网络,并购大中华地区的大客户销售比例同比增幅达7.1%;联想采取了交易型和关系型销售模式取得了较好的市场效果,把握住19%的增长速度的机遇,巩固了大中华市场的领

① 由于联想披露的财务报告中没有披露各分类业务盈利情况,因此,我们无从分析其盈利能力的情况。 

② 由于业绩没有达到杨元庆上任伊始的远景规划,面对员工的困惑、股东和投资者的质疑和问责,杨元庆也坦承3年多来联想多元化的战略失误,并主动降低了50%的年薪,这也才有了联想随后的2004年年初全面收缩战线,重先回归PC业务之举。联想2006年著名品牌咨询公司Interband调查披露的全球品牌前10名的企业,都实行专一化的经营模式。2004年年初联想出台了三年规划,核心内容是收缩战线重新回到PC核心业务以确保主业的增长,并实行了一系列以奥运TOP为核心的国际营销计划来拓展海外市场。  

先地位。2005/06财年第一季度①,大中华地区市场增长稳定,销售收入同比增长35%至79亿港币,这主要得益于中国内地笔记本出货量增长了31%,个人电脑整体出货量同比增长28%,达到150万台以上;第2季度,大中华地区仍然盈利贡献增长最大,销售收入环比增长28.5%达到102亿港元,个人电脑出货量同比增长29%,经营利润环比上升了22.5%达到了5.67亿港元,占联想经营利润的总额的69.7%;第3季度较第2季度增加了5%,市场占有率达37%;从前三季度角度看,大中华地区营收虽仅占37.37%,但却贡献了75.47%的盈利,相对前两季度而言64.05%而言,大中华地区成为联想盈利的主要来源②。 

2006年2月20日Gartner披露亚太地区(不包括日本)2005年个人电脑付运量表现达4170万台,较2004年3310万台上升26.2%,达到了自2000年以最高增长率,国内市场占有率达到了33%,高据榜首位置③。 

美洲市场④05/06第一季度表现平平,销售收入为55亿港币,该区域个人电脑出货量同比下滑4%至82.5万台。但巴西是该区域的唯一的亮点,个人电脑出货量同比增长了58%。该地区实现经营利润2.49亿港币,经营利润率约为4.5%;中东、非洲及欧洲地区销售收入达到37亿港币,该区PC出货量增长达50%;而经营利润约为4000万港币,利润仅仅占1.1%;亚太地区(不包括大中华地区)出现亏损。亚太地区当期销售收入为25亿港币。尽管印度市场的个人电脑出货量同比增长了32%,但由于日本市场业绩仍然萎靡不振,亚太地区个人电脑整体出货量仍然同比下滑了6%至47.4万台。亚太地区市场在2005/06财年第一季度经营亏损达到了2900万港币。 

并购前,联想的90%的营业收入和盈利贡献均来自于大中华地区;并购后,经管联想逐渐具备了国际化公司的雏形,尽管营收来源地域分散,在某种程度上有助于分散经营风

① 受联想04/05财年首季良好业绩的影响,2005年8月1日,联想在联交所以3.125元报收,上涨0.3港元,涨幅10.6%。但高盛公司的分析认为,联想良好的业绩得益于大中华区的推动,尤其是在县级以下市场推广低价电脑,高盛对联想长期的盈利并不看好,因为,维持联想“跑输”大市场的评级。 

② 根据联想最近公布的06/07财报告联想继续延续了同样的困局—除了大中华地区一支中中,海外市场依然未见起色。在截止8月31日06/07的第二季度,联想第二季度的营业额为37亿美元,净利润为3800万美元,现金储备为9.9亿美元;在大中华、欧洲、中东非洲的营业额都有所增长,大中华区销量上升25%,营业收入达14亿美元,占集团营收的39%,在欧洲、中东及非洲区,销售上升5%,营收7.51亿美元,占总额的20%,美洲区销量下降9%,营收11亿美元,占总额的29%;联想笔记本和与去年同期相比,增长9%,台式电脑上升4%,手机为国产手机第一位,但是,美洲区电脑销量下降9%,第二季度美国市场份额为4.1%,较第一季度下降0.1%;而惠普则较上一季度上升1.5%。大中华地区净利率为5.7%;美洲区净利率为-1.7%;欧洲、中东及非洲地区敬利率为-1.1%;亚太区净利率为0.5%。 

Gartner 数据显示2006年7-9月,全球PC行业的市场份额中联想5.9%,宏基5.7%,惠普16.3%,戴尔16.1%。 

③ 联想05/06第四季度在亚太区付运量780万台,增幅28.6%,市场占率18.7%;而位居第二的惠普市场占率仅为10.6%;而竞争对手方正电子(0418.HK)中国付运量为214.3万台,升45%,市场占率为11.1%。 

④ 目前,在竞争激烈的美国市场维护Thinkpad品牌将面临极大的挑战,由于一个成熟市场结构的复杂和多元化使维护销售渠道非常困难,而且联想在美国市场本身变化面前,仍显得销售技巧和经验不足。北京时间2006年5月10消息,联想借助成立一周年纪念日在美国展开Think笔记本的降价促销攻势,其中一款最高降价800美元,降幅达42%。这是新联想成立后首次在美展开大规模的降价行动。联想美国官方网站的促销页面显示,此次促销活动包含了6款ThinPad T、X以及Z系列笔记本、3款ThinkCentre M51台式机以及部分显示器等电脑配件产品。此次活动将持续到5月15日,仅针对美国市场。 联想有关人士否认了要打价格战的质疑,称Think市场策略会继续走高端商务用户路线。其中,ThinkPad品牌的降价明细为:现价849美元,比原价减400美元;现价999美元,比原价减800美元;现价1299美元,比原价减250美元;现价1499美元,比原价减600美元;现价1599美元,比原价减200美元;现价1799美元,比原价减550美元

险;但盈利来源的局面并未有实质的突破,因为大中华区以外地区的盈利情况基本都不尽人意。 

表 联想2005/06第一、二季度销售收入及经营利润率情况汇总 

2005/06第二季度美洲、欧洲及中东、非洲市场的个人电脑出货量均出现了增长,但是受利润率下滑的影响,这些地区业务经营利润也出现了下降。美洲、中东及非洲市场销售收入的环比增长分别达到了63.8%和58.7%,但这两个地区的经营利润分别下滑了13.7%和270%(欧洲、中东、非洲市场甚至出现了6800万港币的亏损,而上一季度实现经营性收益4000万港币),联想在这两个地区面临的竞争越来越激烈。尽管美国市场受价格下调影响,出货量增长6.1%,戴尔增长10%,但联想在美国市场的开拓仍不能令人满意。 

亚太地区(不包括大中华地区)开始获利,但盈利贡献不大,由于印度及其他地区的强劲增长,公司在亚太市场的销售收入环比增长了37.7%。更为重要的是,该地区实现了9900万港币的经营利润,而第一季度该地区却亏损了2900万港币。但该市场收入仅占联想总收入的12%,因此,该市场对联想的整体盈利贡献不大。 

2005/06第三季度,IDC统计美国出货1700万台PC,同比增长11%,戴尔占33.2%的份额。而联想销量为75.1万台,市场份额为4.2%,排名第五。在美洲其他地区,联想业务表现只能勉强认为平稳,在欧洲、中东和非洲利润情况略有改善,但仍然面对扩展产品组合的能力,在亚太地区(不含大中华区)销售有所上升;联想全球PC业务中笔记本营业额占49%,本季度推出了宽屏笔记本Thinkpad Z60和天逸100受到市场好评;联想将借鉴中国的成功经验推行交易型和关系型客户模式,开拓包括中小企业和新由电脑市场等高增长市场。联想凭借Lenovo品牌打开了欧洲市场,已经在45个国家和地区(包括美洲、欧洲、中东、非洲、亚洲及俄罗斯等)的中小企业市场销售Lenovo品牌电脑。在全球范围内,第三季度PC业务较上年同期增长12%,占全球市场份额的7.2%,尽管联想仍然位居三甲。据传宏基最近准备并购Gateway公司,如果成行的话,联想三甲地位岌岌可危。 

表 联想地域营业及盈利情况汇总表(1) 

由于财务数据是历史累计而成的,我们难以根据这些累计的数据中立区分和计算出由于并购造成的影响程度①,同时,财务数据也未必能够清晰地预测和描述出由于并购而产生的未来收益情况,因为联想支付的并购溢价和整合费用也需要至少3年左右的时间消化和吸收,这也会影响到并购前后的财务数据可比性,而选定基准样本数据作为参照对比也变得非常困难

3.7 整合期间效果不尽人意:来自资本市场的经验数据验证 

利用了前面计算出来的回归方程 计算了联想的超额回报率和累计超额回报率,我们发现[3/6/2006,4/21/2006]期间,联想的超额回报总额为-9.035%,但从交易对手这段时间的表现来看,IBM的超额收益率达到了3.6627%。在某种程度上,我们可以简单认为联想该期间仍然没有跑赢大市,这说明联想的投资者仍然看空联想整合期间能够达到协同效应。 

表 联想整合过程中的超额收益情况汇总表 

① Andrade,Mitchell和Stafford曾指出20世纪90年代新的并购浪潮中,由于产业冲击或并购集中的现象将会困惑标准绩效的选择。上述这些因素都是困扰和影响着我们通过财务数据对比分析并购前后产生得效应变化趋势结果的准确性。 

从下图,我们可以发现,[7/14/2005,4/17/2006]期间,累计超额回报率为负说明联想基本没有能够跑赢大市,但交易对手IBM在卖掉PC业务之后,却一路高歌猛进

图 联想整合期间超额回报率和累计超额回报率情况 

图 联想整合期间IBM超额回报率和累计超额回报率情况 

并购交易的整个过程无不体现出双方的商业智慧和谋略。现在来看,定论联想并购的成败,似乎为时过早。至少,一切才刚刚开始。而联想会成为下一个遭遇诅咒的赢家吗?①。作为中国海外并购最大“赢家”的联想,尽管赢得了全球的关注和中国企业的殷殷期待,与交易对手IBM已经实质赢得了市场的尊重相比,联想无论从市场表现、盈利能力、偿债风险、资金压力等指标看,似乎没有逃出“赢家诅咒”的宿命。而联想的整合之路仍

① 前不久,英国《金融时报》的专栏文章“TCL怎么了?”一开头就发出这样的惊呼,作者提出了一个令很多人都疑惑的问题:这些中国企业海外并购的先驱,在什么地方出了差错呢?偏爱收购低技术,但有较高的品牌知名度的目标;并购困难估计不足;并购之后难以入乡随俗,与海外企业实现真正意义上的融合;缺乏长期打算和系统规划,这些或许是“先驱”屡屡跌跤的关键原因。哎哟,收购了法国汤姆逊电视机业务的中国TCL公司,今年上半年亏损了2.05亿美元。2006年10月31日,TCL公布了重组欧洲彩电业务的最新方案,其中包括TTE(TCL与汤姆逊合资)将精简欧洲业务的大部分员工,汤姆逊也将提供部分欧洲员工的安置费。 

然充满了挑战,其中主要来自于成本控制、文化整合、技术创新等方面的风险。目前成败尚难定论①,但联想被市场寄予厚望的全球化销售供应链整合还未显现效果,近期战略调整打击了市场信心,面临着极大的整合风险。在一系列并购后的整合风险中,市场、竞争对手、战略选择、文化、管理与成本能力②、投资者压力、政治等七个维度的困难最大,危及联想生存的隐患也最为突出。现在,联想距离世界级的企业目标已经如此之近,盛誉之下,联想仍要面对自身国际化和规模扩张的副产品,成本的上升与利润的下滑成为棘手的难题。联想仍要坚持成本运营为主的商业模式在其“世界级长跑中会迎来“归核化”之后的又一次极限。如果要逃过被诅咒的宿命,证明自己是笑到最后的赢家,这一路上联想无疑要面对更多的挑战。 

4 政策性建议与结论 

中国是世界最大的经济体之一,以购买力平价计算已经是美国经济的2/3,并且很可能在今后5年内超越德国和英国,到2020年将会超越日本(罗兰.贝格,2005)。中国在世界经济舞台上扮演着举足轻重的角色,而企业更应担当这一历史重任。渐行渐近的并购已成为企业扩张的重要手段。TCL和明基的并购基本以失败告终,这会对试图扩大生产能力,加快进入国际市场的更多中国企业产生“一落叶而知天下秋”的恐惧。并购的确是一把双刃剑,需要理性分析。 

① 1997年,波音并购麦道后陷入了复杂的整合与财务危机中,而竞争对手空客趁机抢夺市场份额,1999年吞掉了全球交付合同额的48%,2003年取代麦道成为民用飞机的最大制造商,但最近却又出现了转机。2002年惠普并购康柏后,业绩反而萎缩,并购前康柏就能压倒戴尔,而并购后的新惠普却将PC冠军拱手让给了戴尔,在2006年第三季度却有自2003年第四季度以来受次超过戴尔登上全球出货量第有第一的位置。 

1997年,台湾宏碁集团(Acer Group)收购了德州仪器公司(Texas Instruments Inc., TXN)个人电脑子公司,由于无法在美国建立庞大的分销网络,因此,该公司将重点重新转向了欧洲市场。 

为进入美国市场铺平了道路,1995年韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)收购了当时全球第五大PC制造商AST Research Inc.,耗资3.77亿美元收购了AST之后三星电子又投入了数亿美元经营这家亏损的子公司,1999年以2亿美元的报价出售该子公司。 

此前,日本电气公司(NEC Corp)于1996年收购了当时零售市场中成绩显赫Packard Bell Electronics Inc.,但最终也很快从零售市场上撤身而退。 

② 下表中表明了联想人工总成本与营业收入比例不断上升,对盈利的负面影响不容忽视。 

4.1 海外并企业购遵循的逻辑①:知彼知己 

中国企业将会在全球并购中扮演着越来越重要的角色②.但在海外并购的进程中,中国企业首先需要考虑和分析自身在行业中所处的位置,无论是积极参与并购,还是采取防御性的措施,都应该在全球舞台中心为自己争取一个会改变行业竞争态势的位置。

全球跨国公司通过海外并购已经有了相当长的历史,并积累了丰富的经验。如果能从并购规则变迁的历史中领悟到有益的投资结构设计技巧,对于尝试海外并购的中国企业而言,势必会降低量交易费用。 

企业决策者在做出重大并购决策之前,我们必须清楚地了解企业的战略目标、风险底线以及海外市场,遵循循序渐进的原则。同时,更应深度思考以下三个命题:1)清晰的战略框架。包括清楚并购动因及实现动因③的成功要素组合,同时还要详细评估相应的风险;2)交易价格的底线以及并购溢价的最大值;3)未来行业或产业发展趋势及对整合的影响因素。 

此外,为了更好实施并购战略,有必要针对当地的经济和社会文化背景,预先制定完备的公关宣传方案,做好院外游说和政府公关,以尽可能减少文化阻力、舆论阻力和政治阻力。 

4.1.1 主导创新:寻找盈利之路 

在日益激烈的市场竞争中,并购扩大规模的局限性非常明显,如果单纯并购不能维护秩序的话,创新必须承担起持续盈利越来越大的责任④。如果要在全球舞台上获胜,企业需要优化产品设计、提高产品研发能力、并可以地将产品创新和服务水平提升有机地统一起来①。尽管经济实力位居世界第四,但中国缺乏核心技术导致大而不强。而作为创新主体的企业在全球的位置将决定中国未来的国运②,中国企业海外并购潮是中国工业发展的一个缩影,增加了中国的国际声誉,但我们有必要重新审视海外并购的问题,通过并购实施国际化不是企业的终极目标。如果企业不惜一切代价只将国际化作为终极目标则会摧毁自身由小到大建立起来的自信文化,同时还会加速企业衰败。 

浸淫香港资本市场多年联想的治理结构已达到或超越了香港监管的要求,早已实现了诱致性的制度变迁。通过并购获得核心技术,目前难有定论,但有一点结论勿庸置疑,如果并购后的联想无法建立起自主创新能力的机制,那么将难以立足国际化的市场③。 

联想有必要从低成本战略中向更有附加价值的品牌战略转型,这个过程非常进难,需要投入更多的研发,同时还要保持销售的耐心。联想的盈利性增长战略无疑是好的,但需要在细分的市场中寻找盈利空间,联想还必须拥有差异化的产品,否则很难实现品牌的国际化。日本本田在国际化进程中的案例可以给我们更多的启发,40年前,本田在美国没有销售渠道,摩托车市场中以哈里.戴维的500CC大排量车为主流,但本田则开发100CC、200CC易发动的小排量的摩托车,逐渐赢得了消费者的忠诚度。 

① 在海外并购中扮演同样重要角色的TCL,李东升总裁坚持的核心逻辑是“大不一定强,但不大一定不强。”这种逻辑思路成为主导TCL大跃进式进行海外并购的重要出发点。尽管,国内市场价格下跌,企业利润变薄,因而地理的扩张成为关乎企业生存的问题。如果不务实,缺乏对并购地市场的充分了解单纯以建立强大的商业帝国作为海外并购的驱动力,没有对收益率进行谨慎评估,这不是可靠的商业逻辑。19800-2001年期间,日本15家最大公司海外并购交易,成功仅有4例。 

因此,在并购之前,企业必须了解市场,同时必须在中国做大,积累足够的自由现金流,这样才能承担任何重组成本。我们更应该从印度企业的海外并购中借鉴经验,一般情况下,印度公司以国内为出发点,具有明显的竞争优势,然后向海外扩张,不仅仅单纯实行低成本的战略。 

② 美TCW集团的分析师Jason Maxwell认为中国在世界舞台上的重要性正在逐渐上升。 

③ IBM商业价值研究院2006年发布的研究报告认为,中国境外投资仍以中小型项目为主,平均投资额为100万美元,大大低于发达国家的600万美元。并且地区分布不平衡,港澳地区仍是内地企业国际化的主要据点,此外,国际化的总体成绩仍然不够理想,能够盈利的只占55%。中国企业国际化的主要动机调查结论为,认为重要性为4.5(最高为5)的是寻找新的业务增长机会;重要性为3.8的是学习先进技术和管理理念,规避国内激烈的市场竞争的为3.1;分散业务和市场风险的为2.8;获取生产资源、提高生产效率及应对宏观环境的都为2.3;获取海外资金的为1.5。 

④ TCL当年力图用汤姆逊完成“品牌嫁接高端化”的战略,明基则挟成本神话整合疲软的西门子手机,目前,两种思路都以失败而告终,简单的解释是TCL收购的产品线结构存在重大缺陷;明基则无法驱动其改善设计和销售渠道。Ross Levine和Sergio Schmukler选取了1989-2000年来自74个国家9096家 

 

4.1.2 未雨绸缪:消除急噪④

在海外并购过程中,中国企业还应遵循共同的游戏范式⑤。包括重视知识产权、劳工法及环境标准等重要因素;努力建立双赢的交易结构安排;对管理中出现的文化差异保持敏感;定义并沟通清晰的协同目标并保留目标组织中的关键人物;积极而稳妥地推动整合过程。 

如果盈利能力持续无法达到投资者的预期,则投资者势必会采取用脚投票,压低股票价格。而联想则需要及早安排反收购措施,包括通行的毒丸术(Position Pill)、金降落伞计划(Gold Parachute)⑥,还可以利用章程规定“公司的合并或控制权转移需要公司

包含国际化和未有国际化的公司作为测量托宾Q变化的样本,结果发现,Q值在国际化(上市或并购)前一年为1.96,,在后一年则迅速下跌为1.53。 

① 借鉴TCL的并购经验,我们发现,国际化的公司肯定不是成本最低的公司,创新才是全球化企业的生命。海外并购的公司必须学会为未来投资。 

② 2006年3月中国政府在十届四次人大会议的工作报告中提出自主创新的强国战略,希望自主创新改变中国产业结构和增长方式,做大做强中国。 

2006年10月,IBM商业价值研究院在对中国100个CEO调查基础上得到研究结果显示,中国企业更倾向于采取跟随战略,43%的中国企业倾向于改进现有的产品及服务,只有4%的愿意推出新的产品和服务,而国际企业的这一比例达到了18%。下表对IBM、DELL等PC厂商研发支出做一比较

③ 在某种意义上,国际化就像一面镜子,像一杆标尺。把中国顶尖企业跟全球玩家的差距一一放大、凸现出来。TCL总裁李东升认为,有些事情你事先做出一个准确的判断是很难的,一一定要跳到这个里面去做了之后才会发现。参见:申音.“TCL持久战”载于《中国企业家》2006年第8期 P52 

④ 丰田公司花了45年的时间做国际营销,才获得了国际品牌咨询公司Interband调查发布的全球品牌的第9名。2006年8月底,哈佛商学院副院长John Quelch日前在中山大学的EMBA开学典礼上告诫中国企业,在全球化的道路上不能急于求成。 

⑤ 从宏观角度看,并购是经济发展压力的释放和动力来源。在技术创新、需求不断变化的全球市场里,因循守旧的原始资源配置方案已不能满足产业结构升级、生产方式质变的客观要求,在突破桎梏的压力下,并购作为一种对盈利机会的本能反应,潜在地改变着社会资源的分配与再分配。 

⑥ 毒丸术是指一旦公司控制权转移就向原股东低价发行新股票,或者要求收购者立即兑付企业原先的债券。金降落伞计划是指在公司章程中规定重组管理层时,收购者需要向原来的高级管理者支付巨额的补偿金。 

4/5表决通过”或者订立“非经股东大会事前以特别决议批准,公司不得与董事等高管以外的人订立公司重要的管理权转移协议”。进一步增加收购的成本。此外,联想需要清晰地总结、分析与平衡国际化的方向和节奏,积极积累国际化的经验与教训,彻底抛弃企业成长与规模扩张进程中的“急躁”弊病而导致的经营困境。 


4.2 海外并购政府扮演的逻辑角色 

4.2.1 政府产权保护作为:古老而现实的问题 

海外并购与产权保护相依相随,英国在19世纪至20世纪初保护海外财产安全依靠的是其强大海军、他国对伦敦金融市场依赖度和工业技术优势三种机制,目前中国似乎不具备以上三类威慑力中的任何一种(陈志武,2005)。以并购方式开拓国际市场不可避免要接受当地法律框架,如果存在法律不健全的地区,或者并购目标是阿根廷、委内瑞拉、苏丹、伊朗、印尼等产权保护不力的国家①,那么,在这种情况下,问题就随之而来了,伴随着海外并购的潮起云涌,投到海外大量的资金如果存有安全隐患呢,我们依靠何种力量加强对海外并购的中国产权进行保护呢?② 从产权保护的视角考虑,为降低海外并购的风险,政府有责任建立起自身的威慑力,提高中国软力量和他们对中国的依赖程度。 

4.2.2 政府扶持③与监管作为:双重目标的政策选择与实施 

外资进入中国市场进一步加剧了国内的市场竞争。在利用外资和维护国家利益双重目标下,我们的监管完善之路仍任重而道远。为给内资企业提供良好的发展平台,可以积极采取积极合理的措施扶持和保护内资企业的健康发展。而监管水平的提高也能创造良好的

① 由于这些国家的历史上曾出现过剥夺外国公司财产的先例,国内政局不稳定和缺乏严谨的法治环境。当地政府可以通过立法等手段对外国公司施加影响,例如,利用税收手段调整利益的分配问题;利用外汇管制手段阻止资本利得的出境;利用民众情绪阻碍中国企业的运营;采取非市场手段对中国企业进行调查等。2007年11月,处于缓解产能的压力,在国内刚刚站稳脚跟的奇瑞汽车正与阿根廷的Socma集团洽谈组建控股合资公司,为南美生产运动型和紧凑型轿车,此外,奇瑞还积极寻求在埃及、伊朗、土耳其、印尼等地进行投资。 

② 2005年秋天,美国国务院决定向联想采购1.6万台电脑,总价值为1300万美元。2006年5月4日,美国众院拨款委员会主席Frank Wolf 致信美国国务院负责外交安全事务的助理国务卿Richard Griffin“联想是一家被中国政府控制的公司,美国国务院应对此笔交易进行调查。”美国国务院随即在5月19日表示,从联想公司订购的电脑将只被用于非保密性工作,同时,美国政府将改变相应的政府采购流程。第二项决定将对联想具有很大的杀伤力,如果改变流程,联想从IBM继承过来的庞大订单将付诸东流,直接压制了联想的海外扩张。尽管美国以安全理由修改流程符合国内法律和国际间的采购协议(GPA),但这明显有悖自由的贸易精神的要义。因此,中国海外并购企业的利益产权保护变得日益紧迫。此后,澳大利亚政府也直接将Lenovo排除在政府定购厂商的名单中。而据《参考消息》2006年6月1日第11版“中国企业在印度屡遭不公正待遇”报道,在过去的5年中,中印贸易额从35亿美元迅速增加到180亿美元,然而,中国企业的投资活动仍然受到限制。继华为、和记黄埔之后,近日又有中集天达公司低价竞标印度42台登机桥(约1755万美元)居然被拒,理由竟然同样是“危害”印度的“国家安全”。 

③ 李东升在2006年两会期间,曾提议:改进外汇管理制度;加强对试点企业境内外融资支持;对并购后能大规模带动出口的试点企业,实行足额退税政策;改进保税政策和人员进出境政策,使试点企业货物(整机、配件等)和人员进出更加方便快捷。具体参见:2006年第8期《中国企业家》报道“走出去需要政策支持”。 

市场环境,有助于推动内资企业的进一步发展和扩张①,为海外并购储备实力。 

海外并购都会面临并购目标所在地法律和行政性的调查压力,还要面临着一些非市场因素的壁垒障碍②。从保护内资企业的发展来说,国家应该积极完善反垄断性并购③与国家经济安全的审查机制。对于海外并购而言,政府可以积极为并购企业提供策略性的指导意见,建立海外并购协调小组推动并购的政府协调工作。 

4.2.3 政府创新与监管推动作为:融资渠道畅通 

金融分业经营与管理导致了金融行业状态条块分割,资本投资渠道组合不畅。风险较高的并购企业资金缺口瓶颈毅然突出。针对并购企业的需求,为分散风险,可以考虑建立多种筹资渠道。鼓励和推动商业银行为并购企业推出专项贷款组合④;平衡债券市场的创新与监管⑤,真正建立有效满足并购的债券市场;放宽国内专项理财业务的投资限制,支持并规范其为并购提供专项理财活动;推动信托创新支持并购重组业务;推动与鼓励持续上升的外汇储备数量进行海外投资⑥。 


4.3 结语 


西方发达国家已经有近五百多年的并购历史,但中国企业的海外并购才刚刚起步,可供中国企业学习和借鉴的生动并购案例少之又少。联想的并购不但向国际化迈出了实质性一步,而且更为中国企业的并购发展提供了一个参照坐标原点。联想的整合仍然面临相当严峻的挑战,尽管,我们无从预见联想整合路程终点的准确答案,但是,如果从历史长河的角度来审视这起并购,联想高层的尽职已远远超越了这一时代赋予给中国企业家的责任。因为,无论,从那个角度看,作为海外并购的先行者—联想都具有里程碑的意义。联想成长壮大的每一步探索都注定会成为中国企业发展可资借鉴的典范,其海外并购与实施

① 我们有必要借鉴和学习韩国和日本在扶持本国企业的经验,主动培育出有创新能力的全球化的中国企业。我们知道,日本和韩国政府在全球化的过程中起到了积极的协调作用,积极为企业提供相应的产业政策支持,培育出了世界著名的三星、索尼、丰田等全球化企业。 

② 我们知道,从联想并购过程中受到美国外国投资委员会严格审查,中海油并购尤尼科石油公司和海尔并购美泰公司等均受到美国政府的积极干预的案例中可以看出:一直积极推动经济全球化和自由贸易的美国早在19世纪30年代就制定《反托拉斯法》和设立了外国投资委员会评估和审查重要行业的跨国并购,其他西方国家亦通过制定完善法律框架,利用严格审查的措施和手段来限制重点行业并购。尤其是中海油、优尼科企业之间的并购则是基于所谓的国家安全利益的调查,美国国内的意识形态力量最终战胜了市场的力量。 

③ 在反垄断审查方面,无论从立法体系和精神,还是程序设计及实际操作方面,美国的反垄断审查机制都极为成熟和完善。我们的反垄断的审查机制还处于初步建设和探索阶段,1993年颁布的《反不正当竞争法》,1997年颁布的《价格法》及其他一些行政性法规,都在不同方面和领域涉及了反垄断的问题,但至今尚没有出台一部系统、完整和统一的反垄断法。按照2006年年初全国人大常务委员会确定的2006年立法计划,《反垄断法》草案将于2006年6月的十届人大常委会第二十二次会议上首次审议。中国的反垄断法历经12年辗转,终于到了最后的冲刺阶段。 

④ 上海证券交易所总经理朱从玖(2006)认为商业银行已经在开始有选择地涉足资本市场业务,下一步可以考虑把并购作为一项专门的业务加以规范、加以制约、加以发展。 

⑤ 目前国内的上市公司只能发可转换债券类的产品,而发行信用债券则是必然的趋势。 

⑥ 中央人民银行10月13日发布的数据显示,截止2006年9月末,我国外汇储备余额达 9879.28亿美元,同比增长28.46%,,储备额仍为世界第一。 

国际化的每一环节积累的经验都有助于推动本土企业的海外并购。 

总之,本文通过分析联想并购的经济后果,希望中国媒体在热炒追捧之余,仍应给予客观和冷静的评论,而这也正是一种理性精神的回归,也是中国企业海外并购走向成熟所必经的阶段。 


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